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ABSTRACT 
HOLLAND, LOCKE, JR. Operational Levels of Cognitive Stage 
Achievement and Representations of Cognitive Structures Used in 
Mathematical Problem Solving by Young Adult Prospective Teachers.  
(1980) Directed by: Dr. Nancy White.  Pp. 151 
The differential achievement among concrete,  transitional,  and 
formal operational levels of cognitive stage in young adults was 
investigated. Also, the relations were tested among (a) cognitive 
stage achievement,  (b) mathematical problem solution success, and 
(c) problem-solving strategies used in mathematics (spontaneous 
figure labeling, chosen solution strategy, and its match with actual 
strategy). 
The cognitive interviews replicated those of Piaget and Inhelder 
(1975) on notions of chance and probability with the use of Green's 
(1978) quasi-standardized procedural and methodological suggestions. 
The relations among cognitive achievement,  success, and strategies 
used with math problem solving were tested with an inventory for 
representations of mathematical cognitive structure (Clark & Reeves, 
in press).  Forty subjects represented prospective teachers.  The 
mean age was 25. 5 years.  
The results of the cognitive interview analysis revealed that 27% 
of the young adults achieved consolidated formal operations, 40% 
demonstrated a partial or transitional achievement towards formal 
thought,  and 33% did not perform beyond concrete operations. Kendall 's  
Tau correlation revealed that cognitive stage achievement and successful 
mathematical problem solving were not independently related. The 
math problem solving strategies were tested to be independently 
related both to cognitive stage achievement and to math problem 
solution success. 
The conclusions were that (a) young adults demonstrated differen­
tiated cognitive stage achievement among concrete,  transitional,  and 
formal operational levels; (b) cognitive stage achievement and problem 
solving success in mathematics are not independent constructs;  and 
(c) problem solving strategies of spontaneous figure labeling, identifying 
solution strategy, and matching it  with employed strategy are not 
related to the constructs in (a) and (b).  Research was recommended for 
cognitive stage achievement of young adults,  i ts relation with discipline-
specific cognitive structures,  and experimental curricula in higher 
education using cognitive developmental goals and problem-solving 
methodologies.  
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CHAPTER I 
INTRODUCTION 
According to Piagetian theory, adults are capable of abstract 
reasoning. For example, they should be able to solve simple word 
problems from algebra and geometry and to explain the strategies 
they use. This expectation would be true especially for prospective 
mathematics teachers.  The purpose of this research was to investigate 
cognitive stage achievement in young adults and its relation to math­
ematical problem solving. 
Jean Piaget has been the most referenced spokesman on cognitive 
development.  He observed and interviewed children to assess the quality 
of their reasoning. From this research he formulated a theory of 
cognitive development.  Early studies were concerned with language 
and thought (1926b), judgment and reason (1926a),  conceptions of the 
world and its causes (1929); and the scope broadened to include children's 
moral judgment (1932) and the origins of intelligence (1952). Jrlis research 
on various qualities of intellectual development has been reported in 
approximately 200 publications. He and Barbel Inhelder updated interpre­
tations of the research in refining the cognitive stage theory (1969b). 
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Piaget established a qualitative distinction between the thinking of 
children and adults.  Inhelder and Piaget initiated the investigation of the 
cognitive functioning of adolescents and adults (1958). They have 
refined the analysis through studying how adolescents reason in different 
areas of knowledge. One example was the investigation of formal operations, 
the highest stage of cognitive development,  in adolescents relating to notions 
of chance and probability (first  reported in 1961, published in English in 
197 5).  Two of these interview tasks were replicated in this research 
using young adult subjects.  
The distinction of formal operations achievement has not been clear 
between adolescents and adults,  much less among various ways to group 
adults.  Historically, scientific theories of human development orginated 
with a child's conception and stopped at the conclusion of puberty. The 
assumption was that the development of intelligence and other human 
qualities followed the pattern of the more obvious physical development.  
Legal adult status has been defined at physical maturity, for example, 
when citizens can vote, serve in the military, work without legal restric­
tions, and own property. Strong suspicion emerged recently tkat furthei 
refinement among adolescent and adult levels of thinking was needed: 
from researchers (Baltes & Labouvie, 1973; Erikson, 1968; Gould, 1978, 
Horn, 1970; Horn & Catell ,  1967; Kohlberg, 1973; Levinson, 1978; Vaillant,  
1977), popular l i terature (Sheehy, 1976), and life-span texts in developmental 
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psychology (Craig, 1980; Kastenbaum, 1979; Schell  & Hall,  1979; Vander 
Zanden, 1978). Arlin (1975) speculated that a stage beyond formal operations 
existed to account for what appeared to be the creative intelligence of some 
scientists and artists.  In an effort to contribute to the understanding of 
cognitive operations in young adults,  this research replicated studies of 
operational behavior in which adolescent subjects were used. 
Nature of the Problem 
This research investigated formal operational reasoning in young 
adults.  What was known about adolescent cognition originated with Inhelder 
and Piaget (1958) and has been modified in replication research. Piagetian 
descriptions of adolescent reasoning have dominated the field. For example, 
his theory and research were the singular source of knowledge on adolescent 
cognition in the current proliferation of texts in child psychology, human 
development and developmental psychology (Alexander,  Roodin, & Gorman, 
1980; Ausubel & Sullivan, 1970; Craig, 1980; Fein, 1978; Gallagher & 
Mansfield, 1980; Gardner,  1978; Learner & Spanier,  1980; Papalia &: Olds, 
1979; Rice, 1978; Vander Zanden, 1978). 
Piaget was fascinated with how children reason. He observed their 
behavior,  interviewed them for their understandings, and set up simple, 
manipulative experiments for them to describe their experiences. These 
behaviors have been interpreted as representing certain mental abilit ies 
or unseen mental structures.  He organized his research into a theory of 
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cognitive development,  an explanation of how humans refine their mental 
behavior as a function of physical maturation and environmental experi­
ences. The research on the thinking of children (1926a, b,  1952) established 
qualitative distinctions with adult thought.  The descriptions have been 
accepted among both theoretical (Ausubel & Sullivan, 1970; Elkind & 
Flavell ,  1969; Flavel,  1977) and educational psychologists (Bruner,  1966, 
1973; Furth, 1970; Furth & Wachs, 1975). 
Piaget 's pioneering research on the cognitive structures of adoles­
cence (with Inhelder,  1958) created more questions than answers. 
Adolescents reasoned differently from children. They considered multiple 
options simultaneously, reasoned abstractly with the aid of symbols,  and 
deliberated hypothetical paradoxes. Yet this period was perplexing: 
choices became overwhelming, emotions appeared to conflict with reason, 
and an emerging introspection reflected an awkward self- and social-
cons ci-ousness (Elkind, 1974). 
Piaget used the research on adolescents to define the formal 
operational stage of cognitive development.  Piaget 's formal operational 
characteristics of adolescents have been validated through replication 
(Jackson, 1965; Kuhn & Anageler,  1975; Lovell ,  1961b; Neimark, 1975b; 
Webb, 1974). His interpretations, however, of adolescent thinking have 
not been accepted as universally as his conclusions on young children. 
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For example, Berry and Dasen (1974) in a cross-cultural replication did 
not verify the formal operational characteristics of youngsters in nonliterate 
cultures.  Dulit  (1975) discovered that only highly gifted males achieved 
formal operations in a study that included females. Neimark (1975a) 
noted wide variation in thinking among adolescents,  especially higher 
cognitive functioning for those with former experiences with the research 
tasks; he concluded that the stage was inadequately defined. Piaget (1972b; 
& Inhelder,  1973) admitted that the investigation of adolescent thought was 
incomplete.  Undetected prior experiences may have been necessary to 
formal operations achievement.  Other researchers (Kohlberg & Meyer, 
1972; Wason & Johnson-Laird, 1972) doubted that all  adults achieve formal 
operations. 
The study was conducted to identify the developmental relation 
between cognitive stage and mathematical problem solving in young adults.  
The extent of young adults '  formal operations achievement was investigated. 
And the relations between operational levels of cognitive stage and mathe­
matical problem solving were identified. 
Background for the Study 
Adolescent and Young Adult Reasoning 
Based on his -research findings Piaget theorized that normal human 
beings could develop the thinking behaviors of formal operations by 
approximately age 15 (Flavell ,  1977; Ginsburg & Opper, 1978; Inheldei & 
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Piaget,  1958; Piaget,  1967, 1972b). Assuming his analysis to be accurate^ 
many educators organized the educational experiences of adolescents 
according to the descriptions of formal operations (Bruner,  I960, 1966, 
1973; Combs, 1974; Elkind, 1976; Furth, 1970, 1975; Gwynn & Chase, 
1969; Holt,  1967; Kohlberg & Mayer, 1972; Macdonald, Wolfson, & Zaret,  
1973; Rogers,  1969; Schwab, 1962; Silberman, 1970). For example, 
abstract and logical reasoning was expected of a high school geometry 
student.  Hypothetical interpretations of intangible symbols were required 
in a college li terature course. A high school history teacher expected 
students to analyze the multiple details of events,  documents and human 
motives, to resolve contradictory interpretations, and to defend a contem­
porary legal position. Although Piaget did not specify how to apply the 
research and theory of formal operations into educational settings, many 
high school and college educators used Piaget to justify their instructional 
decisions for adolescents and young adults.  
There appeared to be an experimental disparity over the achieve­
ment of formal operations in young adults between Inhelder and Piaget 
(1958) and a host of studies in the 1970's (Blasi & H^ffel,  1974; Banner &. 
Day, 1977; Papalia & Bielby, 1974; Schwebel,  1975; Tomlinson-Keasey, 
1972). For example, Kuhn, Langer,  Kohlberg, and Haan (1977) studied 
the cognitive stage achievement of 265 adolescents and adults,  aged 12 to 
50 years.  They reported that only 30-50% of the sample demonstrated any 
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formal operational reasoning on each of several problems. Nearly one-
fourth of the sample performed at the concrete operational level on all  
tasks, while the remaining portion of the sample performed transitionally 
between the concrete operational and formal operational levels.  Such 
findings indicated that adolescents and young adults varied in the level of 
their cognitive attainment.  
Adolescent and Young Adult Problem-Solving Experiences 
Problematic inquiry has been a characteristic associated with 
formal operational thought (Ausubel & Sullivan, 1970; Scandura, 1977). 
In schools,  teachers of adolescents have chosen learning goals that 
require abstract reasoning. English teachers asked students to imagine 
multiple,  possible explanations about the symbolic whiteness of Moby 
Dick or of snow in a Robert Frost poem and to document their interpre­
tation logically. Language teachers asked for intuitive, cultural 
explanations of idioms. A college math student could have mistaken 
an assignment of a tautological proof as originating in a philosophy class.  
The cognitive structures of problem solving were interdisciplinary. 
The rigor of the scientific method was based on it  (Kerlinger,  1973). Its 
precision was valued as the essence of mathematical learning (Scandura, 
1977). Some educational philosophers have adopted inquiry as the essence 
of an education: "a problem well put is half solved" (Dewey, 1938, p.  108). 
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Both the process of problem solving (Bruner,  I960; Parker & Rubin, 
1966) and the structure of problem solving (Furd & Pugno, 1964) have been 
hailed as the interdisciplinary purpose of all  subjects.  Dewey's pedagogical 
creed of 1897 anticipated the problematic,  structural essence of education: 
"I believe, finally, that education must be conceived as the continuing 
reconstruction of experience; that the process and the goal of education 
are one and the same thing" (Dewey, 1915, p.  xix).  Dewey's progressive 
education movement of the 1930's in America was rekindled by the open 
school movement (1965-1975) inspired by Piaget.  For both men, problem 
solving was both a description and goal of human achievement.  
The problematic thought of formal operations was the least 
researched of Piaget 's cognitive stages. Teachers of adolescents and 
young adults were assumed to be qualified if they were proficient only in 
their respective subject matter.  Knowing how formal operational thinkers 
reasoned appeared to be irrelevant.  Secondary (grades 7-12) teaching 
certifications generally required only one course in educational psychology, 
which was usually preoccupied with testing practices.  No expectation 
existed for teachers in higher education to understand how younv adults 
reasoned. Problem solving, as synthetic learning (Bloom, 1956), appeared 
unamenable to the analytic (piecemeal) tradition of college syllabi and 
texts.  Major blame has been traced to the training of prospective teachers 
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(Piaget,  1970c).  Problem*solving curricula were more work for both 
teachers and students,  and the learning was difficult  to assess (Bruner,  
I 9 6 0 ) .  
Problem Solvit! and Mathematics Education 
Ausubel and Sullivan (1970) described problem solving as 
"any activity in which both the cognitive representations of prior 
experience and the components of a current problem situation are 
reorganized in order to achieve a designated objective" (p. 630). They 
further identified three levels of problem solving: (a) Trial-and-error 
was characterized by a series of random or systematic choices until  
the successful "right answer" appeared to work, (b) An underlying 
principle was assumed to exist.  One created a rule that would explain 
the problem in a way that could be tested, (c) Alternatively, one sought 
to discover a law or system of interrelationships indemic to the solution 
of the problem. Such insight involved a model transferred from a previous 
experience or a fundamental cognitive restructuring. Insights emerged 
suddenly or discontinuously. Thinking was a special case of problem 
solving, "When the activity is limited to the manipulations of images, 
symbols,  and symbolically formulated propositions, and does not involve 
overt manipulation of objects" (p. 630). Thinking appeared to describe 
the abstract process of formal operations, a process that neither depended 
upon nor excluded tangible manipulations to solve problems. 
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Ausubel and Sullivan (1970) reinforced Piagetian notions of cognitive 
development that were reflected in problem solving approaches. Reorgan­
ization of both cognitive representations and problem conceptualizations 
occurred as a function of cognitive achievement.  For example, as egocen-
tricity and subjectivity of children's thought declined with age, qualitative 
increases in thinking and problem solving occurred. Agreement was 
uniform in the research on this point,  perhaps diminishing the contra­
dictory evidence of stage achievement.  
Problem solving was a multidimensional process not to be equated 
with any one of the factors that influenced its development.  Intelligence 
often correlated positively to trial-and-error (Nelson, 1936) and insightful 
problem solving (Stevenson et al .  ,  1968); yet i t  was only a part of a 
problem-solving ability (Gallagher,  1964). Other factors that influenced 
problem solving included: grade in school,  cumulative experience, 
cognitive traits like flexibili ty and curiosity, cognitive style,  motivational 
traits,  and success experiences. 
Piaget (1967) described an essential distinction between formal 
(abstract) and concrete operations as the ability to solve problems in 
different ways. Concrete problem solving strategies involved the 
manipulation of objects.  Formal thinking, or what Piaget preferred to 
label "hypothetico-deductive" (p. 62) thinking, involved the mental 
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executions and reflections selected among several possible operations: 
"Formal operations engender a ' logic of propositions'  in contrast to 
the logic of relations, classes, and numbers engendered by concrete 
operations" (p. 63).  Only formal operations, begun around age 11 or 
12, detached and liberated its thinking from concrete reality in order 
to reflect and theorize. 
Achieving an optimum match between cognitive structure and 
content structure became a cardinal principle of developmental psychology 
and educational pedagogy. Developmentalists (Flavell ,  1977; Piaget,  
1952a, 1972b) argued the principle from the learner 's perspective: mental 
structures determined the environmental structures one perceived. Bruner,  
in defining structure as "how things are related" (I960, p.  7) described 
that what was perceived in learning a discipline was i ts structures.  
Bloom's (1956) taxonomy of cognitive development influenced educators in 
demonstrating the cognitive levels of learners and in offering a guide for 
describing content goals at higher levels of cognitive reasoning than 
accumulation of information. The cognitive match between the learner 
and the content has been argued developmentally. And the curricular 
match among educational goals,  instruction and evaluation has been 
argued pedagogically. Mathematics educators defined structure as the 
interrelationships of mathematical concepts which were achieved through 
an optimum match with the cognitive structure of the learner (Lovell,  
1976; Moyer, 1978; Scandura, 1967; Suppes, 1967). Mathematics learning 
was conceptualized as "understanding the structure of inquiry" (Schulman, 
1970, p.  70).  
Teaching and Learning with a Piagetian Model of Inquiry 
Elkind (1976) described how Piagetian ideas have had great impact 
on the mathematics emphasis ("new math") of Piagetian problem solving 
tasks and conceptual hypothetical relationships. Elkind agreed with 
Piaget 's description of the problem with teaching children about numbers 
without their understanding the logical relations of the problems which the 
numbers represented: 
Experiments that we have been able to carry out on the develop­
ment of mathematical and physical ideas have demonstrated that 
one of the hasic causes of passivity in children in such fields,  
instead of the free development of intellectual activity they should 
provide, is due to the insufficient dissociation that is maintained 
between questions of logic and numberical and metric questions. 
In a problem of velocities,  for example, the student must 
simultaneously manage reasoning concerning the distances 
covered and the lengths util ized, and carry out a computation 
with the numbers that express these quantities.  While the 
logical structures of the problem is not solidly assured, the 
numerical considerations remain without meaning, and on the 
contrary, they obscure the system of relationship between each 
element.  Since the problem rests precisely on these numbers, 
the child often tries all  sorts of computations by gropingly 
' .pplying the procedures that he knows, which has the effect of 
blocking his reasoning powers (Piaget,  1976, pp. 99-100). 
Research concerning teaching and learning with a Piagetian model 
of inquiry (Renner,  Stafford, Lawson, McKinnon, Friot & Kellogg, 1976) 
reported on the transition from concrete to formal opt; rations of high 
school and col Lege students.  Renner,  Stafford and Friot discovered that 
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consolidation of concrete operations occurred more frequently in problem 
solving and in active learning experiences than in so called traditional,  
passive learning curricula. The research illustrated great gains in 
operational reH .son.iig by an inquiry curricular approach. The assump­
tion was that children were capable of the respective concrete and formal 
operational reasoning by an inquiry curricular approach..  The assumption 
was that children were capable of the respective concrete and formal 
operational behavior at the age ranges specified by Piaget and that they 
needed problem solving opportunities to consolidate their cognitive 
potential.  McKinnon discovered that less than 50% of the college students 
had achieved formal operations. Other educational psychologists (Furth, 
1970; Furth & Wachs, 1975) have created curricula organized around 
Piaget 's descriptions of how children develop mentally through inquiry 
or problem solving experiences. 
Assumptions 
Cognitive structures were hypothetical constructs of cognitive 
developmental stage theory (Piaget,  1970b). Theory could not be tested 
directly. In this research cognitive stage achievement was measured by 
observing the reasoning behaviors of subjects who were assumed to 
represent cognitive activity. The behavioral tasks selected (Inhelder 
& Piaget,  197 5) were assumed to be appropriate representations of 
cognitive structures in young adults.  Likewise, representations of 
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mathematical cognitive structures were measured by judging the success 
and procedures used in solving mathematical problems (Geeslin & Shavelson, 
197 5).  The selection of prospective mathematics teachers who were college 
juniors was assumed to be an appropriate sample for studying the relation 
between cognitive stage achievement and mathematical problem solving 
structures in young adults.  
Research Questions 
Cognitive stage achievement and its relationship to mathematical 
cognitive structures in young adults were examined by answering the four 
questions below. 
1.  Did young adults demonstrate differential achievement among 
concrete,  transitional,  and formal operational levels of cognitive stage? 
2. Was there a significant ( p < .  05) relationship between the 
operational levels of cognitive stage achievement and successful mathe­
matical problem solving in young adults? 
3. Was there a significant (p < .  05) relationship between the 
operational levels of cognitive stage achievement and problem solving 
characteristics in young adults? 
4. Was there a significant (p < .  05) relationship between suc­
cessful mathematical problem solving and problem solving characteristics 
in young adults ? 
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Definitions 
Operational Levels of Cognitive Achievement 
Cognitive development was a gradual and continuous process of 
reorganization of mental structures (Ginsburg &Opper, 1979). Piaget 
(1970b) accounted for qualitatively different levels of reasoning, knowing, 
or demonstrated intelligence in adolescents through the identification 
of the concrete and formal operational stages. Concrete operations util ized 
direct physical experience to organize mental responses. Formal 
operations was abstract reasoning. Piaget categorized one's cognitive 
achievement based on the highest level of one's performance. Kuhn et al .  
(1977) found this scoring criterion too broad, and they identified a 
transitional group of young adults achieving between consolidated concrete 
and consistent formal operations. Cognitive achievement in this research 
was defined operationally by the combined scoring on two replicated 
Piagetian tasks. Cognitive achievement was categorized as concrete,  
transitional,  or formal operational level.  
Cognitive Structures Used in Mathematical Problem Solving 
Piaget conceptualized a mental structure as "a form of organization 
of experience .  .  .  tools of one's behavior .  .  .  forms equilibrium toward 
which the intellectual coordinations tend" (in Batto, 1973). Cognitive 
structures were mental organizations of behavior.  The relationship 
between cognitive achievement levels and selected cognitive structures 
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of problem solving were examined in this research. Ausubel and Sullivan 
(1970) defined problem solving as the insightful discovery of a system of 
relationships underlying the solution of a problem. Problem-solving structures 
were defined operationally in this research by successful solution, labeling 
solving procedure, and identifying solution strategy. Mathematical cognitive 
structures were defined as mathematical cocepts (Geeslin &t Shavelson, 1975) 
that were measured in six selected mathematical problems. 
Limitations and Delimitations 
This research was limited to (a) replicating Piagetian interviews 
to measure levels of cognitive achievement in young adults,  and (b) 
describing the relationship between cognitive stage achievement and 
selected cognitive structures used in mathematical problem solving. 
The examination and categorization of young adults '  cognitive achievement 
were determined by the combined performance on two cognitive develop­
mental tasks. The cognitive structures used in problem solving were 
determined by an analysis of six mathematical problems. The research 
sample was student volunteers from the three sections of a college 
mathematics education course. 
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CHAPTER II 
REVIEW OF THE LITERATURE 
The key constructs of this research were cognitive stage achieve­
ment and selected cognitive structures used in mathematical problem 
solving. The research li terature that refined these notions is presented 
in this chapter.  Emphasis is given to the interrelation of the constructs.  
Cognitive Achievement and Cognitive Structure 
Cognitive development is a reorganization of mental structures that 
is gradual and continuous (Ginsburg & Opper, 1979). A study of cognitive 
development seeks to describe the changes of reasoning and knowing 
that occur within an individual over time and the variations of such 
changes among people (Baltes,  Reese, & Nesselroade, 1977). A cognitive 
perspective on the human experience "is conceptualized as a complex 
system of interacting processes which generate,  code, transform, and 
otherwise manipulate information of diverse sorts" (Flavell ,  1977). 
Piaget (1970b) cited four interacting factors that explain how thinking 
develops: (a) the biological maturation of the nervous system, (b) active, 
physical experiences with objects and events in the environment,  (c) 
the social transmission influence of education, language, and culture, 
18 
and (d) the equilibration or self regulation of the assimilation-accom-
modation that accounts for the individual 's interaction with the environ­
ment and one's subsequent adaptation or developmental change. According 
to Piaget,  cognitive development resulted in the formation of general 
structures of knowledge that are common to all  members of the species; 
the general structures permitted learning, which was always specific,  to 
% 
take place. 
Cognitive development is the changing process of acquiring and 
using knowledge. Within this context,  the terms intelligence and knowledge 
are synonymous with cognition. Piaget 's (1976) research resulted in the 
following conclusions about cognitive development.  The interrelationships 
of these concepts formed a theoretical explanation of cognitive behavior 
in humans. 
1.  Knowledge is constantly linked with actions (physical,  
emotional,  and social) or mental operations, that is,  with transformations. 
Knowing is an active process of interaction (subject with object),  rather 
than a passive interpretation or perception of knowledge as external to the 
self.  
2.  The natural consequence of interactions is construction. 
Construction implies two types of independent activity: (a) the coordina­
tion of actions themselves and (b) the interrelations between objects.  
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What is constructed as a person acts are structures (conceptualizations 
for organizing, classifying, coordinating, etc.  ).  Structures are hypo­
thetical constructs of human activity used to explain how a person knows 
and, therefore, how he thinks. 
3.  Actions that become internalized (so that they may be used 
in more ways than initially constructed, that are reversible,  and are 
seen as relational to other structures) are transformed into operations. 
Operational structurations (subdivided into concrete operational and 
formal operational stages) are dependent upon the transformation of a 
person's activity. 
4.  A general theory of the development of intelligence focuses on 
the fundamental relations among the biological theory of adaptation by 
self-regulation, developmental psychology and genetic epistomology. 
Especially clear is this interdependence in the development of logico-
mathematical structures.  The relations of inclusion, order and corres­
pondence appear in biologic origin in genetic (DNA) programming of 
embryologic development and in physiologic organization. They become 
fundamental structures of behavior in early development,  and they 
become refined with logic and mathematics in more abstract thought.  
5.  The process of assimilation, both in a biological and 
intellectual sense, explains the integration of external elements into a 
person's evolving or complete structures.  Assimilation accounts for 
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the understanding of new physical and mental acitivity within existing 
schemes. 
6. Accommodation is the cognitive complement of assimilation. 
Accommodation modifies an assimilatory scheme or structure by the 
elements it  assimilates,  thereby creating a new scheme. Accommodation 
is cognitive adaptation. 
7.  Assimilation and accommodation are interdependent,  are 
mutually subordinate and are present in all  activity. Intelligent behavior 
is defined as the achievement of a balance--a state of equilibrium--between 
assimilation and accommodation. When assimilation outweighs accommo­
dation, one behaves egocentrically, even autistically. Conversely, one 
imitates l i terally without meaning or schematic transformation. Achieving 
equilibrium between assimilation and accommodation in intellectual 
behavior is analagous to achieving a balance between content (substance, 
meaning) and form in the fine arts.  
8. Equilibrium is more progressively achieved as the individual 
develops. The emergence and gradual achievement of reversible opera­
tions and decentration allow an individual to refine the egocentric 
assimilation and incomplete accommodation of early childhood into an 
increasing harmony between the two. 
9. Stages of cognitive development exist under these two 
conditions: 
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(a) that they must be defined to guarantee a constant order of 
succession, and (b) that the definition allow for progressive 
construction without entailing total preformation. These two 
conditions are necessary because knowledge obviously involves 
learning by experience, which means an external contribution in 
addition to that involving internal structures,  and the structures 
seen to evolve in a way that is not entirely predeterminal (Piaget,  
1976, p.  22).  
The Optimal Match in Mathematics Education: Mathematical 
Structure (Concepts) and the Cognitive 
Structure of the Learner 
In a recent nation-wide review of current practices in mathematics 
education, Gibney and Karnes (1979) reported that instructional methods 
embodied mostly traditional content derived primarily from a narrow 
range of relatively standard mathematics texts.  Likewise, in their 
comprehensive review of educational instruction, Stake and Easley 
(1978) discovered that mathematics teaching at all  levels consisted 
predominantly of going over the problems assigned with either the 
teacher or the student working at the chalkboard while others observed. 
This trend was surprising in light of alternative, active learning curriculum 
projects of the last decade. It  was concluded that the instructional pendulum 
appears to be swinging back to one teaching source--the textbook. 
In contrast to the above practice of l imiting consideration of 
effective mathematical instruction to traditional ways of responding to 
the textbook, many educators looked at how students and teachers 
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organize mathematical concepts as a source of knowledge that had 
important implications for mathematics instruction. Suppes (1967), 
for example, clearly proclaimed that the ultimate objective of basic 
research in mathematics education was to understand how students learn 
mathematics and to use this understanding to outline more effective ways 
of organizing the curriculum. There appeared to be a need to discover a 
more specific understanding of the relationships among modes of mathe­
matical representatives, cognitive-developmental levels of organizing 
knowledge, and educational methodology. 
This position was outlined by Moyer (1978), who believed that 
considerable learning difficulties arose if the instructor did not take 
into account the cognitive structure of the learner.  Schulman (1970) 
amplified this pcint,  noting that "If the two structures (mathematical and 
cognitive) are consonant the new principle or concept can be taught; if  
they are dissonant,  they cannot" (p. 42).  This point was made lucidly by 
Scandura's (1967) initial  observation: 
Any reasonable complete understanding of mathematical learning 
and performance will  depend on (1) the identification of taose 
' ideal1  competencies underlying various kinds of mathematical 
behavior .  .  .  and (2) an understanding of how inherent psychological 
capacities and subject matter competencies already developed by a 
learner interact with external stimulation to produce mathematical 
learning and performance (p. 121). 
Further,  Gagne (1967) made almost an identical observation in identify­
ing two categories of variables: 
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(1) knowledge, that is,  the capabilit ies the individual possesses 
at any given stage in the learning; (2) and instruction, the 
content of the communications presented within the frames 
a learning program (p. 7).  
The reasoning was clear: examination of the relationship between learners '  
cognitive structures and mathematical structures to be taught was essential 
in determining appropriate mathematical curricula. Two related issues 
emerged from this position: (1) what was the nature of the mathematical 
representation or structure which was to be learned, and (2) what was the 
nature of the spontaneously occurring cognitive organizers which furnished 
representations and meaning for the mathematical content? 
The notion of an optional match between mathematics instruction 
and learner knowledge or learner cognitive structure had important 
implications for mathematics education since the research in mathematics 
has focused almost exclusively on the former (mathematical concepts) 
(Suppes, 1967). There seems to be an implicit  suggestion that because 
research has tended to focus on mathematical concepts per se and students '  
solutions to problems, there has not developed a sufficient data base from 
which textbook manufacturers could alter their organization of textbook 
materials.  Concerning the second issue raised above, one may inquire 
about the nature of cognitive organizers and spontaneous cognitive 
processes involved in learners '  understanding of mathematical concepts.  
Over a decade ago Scandura (1967) reported that such processes 
as mental imagery, cognitive organization, and mental representations 
involved in thinking and understanding any domain of mathematics had 
scarcely begun to be studied from a scientific standpoint.  Since then 
Wittrock (1974) identified two general features which appear to be 
involved in the natural organization of mathematical understanding: 
(a) organizational structures for storing and retrieving information and 
(b) processes for relating new information to the stored information. 
Three other theorists-Piaget (1970b), Bruner (1966), and Rosch (1975)-
developed and reported comprehensive investigations of various 
cognitive processes which both encompassed and elaborated Wittrock's 
distinction. 
For Piaget,  thinking was an action that transformed one reality 
state into another,  thereby leading to knowledge of the state.  To under 
stand a state (or a mathematics problem) was to understand the 
transformations from which the state resulted. These implicit  mental 
actions or the covert transformations were of special interest to 
mathematics education. 
For Piaget,  the notion of a cognitive structure or stage entailed 
specific properties.  Cognitive stages were organizations of trans­
formation characterized by properties of interdependency, and hence, 
reversibili ty.  These stages took the form of self-regulating systems, 
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and because any element of the system was logically derived from 
other elements of the system, they were said to represent structures. 
Furthermore, stages formed a hierarchical sequence such that higher 
stages necessarily incorporated lower stages through the construction 
of more comprehensive systems of organization. 
Piaget further distinguished between two kinds of knowledge: 
operative knowledge (derived from transformations and coordinations 
of relationship) and figurative knowledge (derived from mental represen­
tations of objects, events, and reality states). Pinard and Laurendeau 
(1969) made an explicit and detailed analysis of the stage construct 
used by Piaget, which elucidated aspects of operative knowledge. Furth 
(1969) also provided a sketch of figurative aspects of knowledge. 
Both aspects of knowledge were important for mathematical learning. 
When a mathematical idea to be learned depended on a level of thought 
beyond that which the learner possessed or which required a cognitive 
organizer not present in the learner's mental repertoire, the idea was 
either partially learned or learned with much difficulty. This notion 
was made quite explicit by Piaget and Inhelder (1969) who stited, "Txie 
subject requires an instrument of assimilation which takes in the 
essential aspects of the concept, failing which he cannot assimilate it" 
(p. 200). Lovell (1976) reiterated this point from an empirical viewpoint 
noting that "all experience at Leeds suggests that, in the case of-able 
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pupils,  once it  is  available in one type of task, the logical instrument 
soon becomes available in related tasks" (p. 167). 
Defined as instruments of assimilation, cognitive structures took 
on four forms; each represented a stage in the ontogenesis of intellectual 
development.  This research was concerned only with the higher 
structures of intelligence, the concrete operational and formal operational 
stages. According to Piaget,  concrete operations was characterized 
by a system of logico-mathematical groupings which operated on concrete 
materials,  that is,  materials able to be experienced or manipulated. 
Formal operations, on the other hand, involved the formation of hypo-
thetico-deductive thought which transcended the concrete world of objects 
and events by subsuming such experiences under the realm of possible 
transfo rmations. 
Formal operational thought emerged from about 12 years of age 
in the brightest pupils and from 14-15 years of age in more ordinary 
students.  One pervasive characteristic of this thought which had import 
for learning mathematics was the ability to construct and manipulate 
second-degree operations (regulations of transformations between 
relations).  Students at this stage could structure relations between 
relations, for example, as in metric proportion involving the recognition 
of the equivalence of two ratios (Lovell ,  1976). 
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A variety of studies by Lovell  (1961), Lunzer (1965), and Lovell 
and Butterworth (1966) with British students,  and of Steffe and Parr 
(1968) and Gray (1970) with American students,  confirmed that apart 
from the ablest 12-year-olds, i t  was from the beginning of junior 
high school onwards that the facili ty was acquired to understand metric 
proportions. To the regret of high school mathematics teachers,  many 
students could not do this until  14-15 years of age, and some were never 
able to do it .  
Evidence from recent research indicated that as many as half of 
the adult population failed to attain the formal operational level (Blasi 
& Hoeffel,  1974; Danner & Day, 1977; Papalia & Bielby, 1974: Schwebel,  
1975; Tomlinson-Keasey, 1972). One study of 265 adolescents and adults,  
aged 12 to 50 years (Kuhn, Langer,  Kohlberg, & Haan, 1977), reported 
that only 30-50% of the sample demonstrated any formal operational 
reasoning on each of several problems. Nearly one-fourth of the same 
sample performed at the concrete operational level on all  tasks, with 
the remaining portion of the sample performing transitionally between 
the concrete operational and formal operational levels.  Such findings 
indicated that adolescents and young adults varied in the level of their 
cognitive attainment.  
The issue of mature cognitive attainment was in need of further 
elaboration. If all  adults did not routinely operate at the formal level,  
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one might have asked what factors were influential.  Piaget (1972) 
discussed this problem from the point of view of developmental psychology. 
According to his reasoning, different types of schooling and social 
experiences may have influenced the rate of development,  and disadvan­
tageous environmental conditions may have precluded advanced forms of 
thought from appearing altogether.  Factors such as career motivations 
and aptitudes also played a role in determining the manner in which formal 
thought became manifest,  by the very fact that certain individuals 
naturally followed interests that inherently led to problems which 
transcended the field of immediate experience. 
Lovell  (1976) discussed implications of failing to achieve formal 
thought: 
this is a matter of great consequence; i t  has repercussions 
in the teaching of physics and chemistry. This inability to 
handle metric proportion until  these ages clearly shows the 
dependence of the growth of mathematical understanding on 
the growth of the general ways of knowing (p. 171). 
Such a body of research had clear implications: If learning metric 
proportion was constrained by cognitive stage, other related mathe­
matical concepts were probably influenced. Evidence indicated that 
i t  was the general ways of knowing (cognitive stages) which determine 
the manner in which material was understood (Green, 1979). 
Equally important,  however, was the limitation placed on learning 
by a student 's figurative knowledge. Figurative knowledge took a 
variety of forms--for example, mental images, perceptions, imitations, 
and language. Figurative knowledge, or representational modes were 
characterized by Bruner (1966) as enactive (concrete-manipulable),  
iconic (pictorial-figural),  and symbolic (algebraic-semantic).  It  was 
one or more of these forme that instructional representations of 
concepts and problems took. The relationship between instructional 
mode and cognitive factors was the specific focus of recent studies by 
Hancock (1972, 1975) and Geeslin and Shavelson (1975). Hancock (1972, 
197 5) compared the cognitive preferences of ninth-grade students and 
college students for verbally oriented material.  Differences in achieve­
ment were found between a verbal instructional program and a figural 
program among college students.  No differences were found among the 
ninth graders.  Hancock (1975) suggested that perhaps these ninth graders 
had not yet developed a cognitive preference for (or at least an adaptability 
to) material that was verbally oriented. 
In a related study, Geeslin and Shavelson (197 5) analyzed the 
representation of a mathematical structure in students '  cognitive 
structures.  The results of their study indicated that,  among eighth-
grade students,  the learning of mathematical structure might not be 
related to solving problems involving that mathematical structure. The 
finding suggested the possibili ty that the cognitive organizations of 
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teachers and students could correspond and stil l  have students unsuccessful 
at  solving problems relevant to the mathematical structure. 
Research which addressed the relationship between cognitive 
representations and meaning emerged in the recent work of Rosch (1973, 
1975; Heider,  1971, 1972; Heider & Olivier,  1972). Rosch's central thesis 
embodied the proposition that psychological categories had an internal 
structure which regulated meaning as a function of degree rather than 
truth value (the traditional logical/mathematical orientation).  According 
to Rosch,psychological categories were organized around central,  proto­
typical members or exemplars which were "good" examples of that 
category. Peripheral members of the same category differed from the 
prototypical member not in terms of identify/nonidentity,  but in terms 
of degree of relatedness. Degree of relatedness, in turn, corresponded 
to notions such as proximity, centrality,  and representativeness. 
In summary, three emergent themes have been highlighted from 
the research related to mathematics education: (a) cognitive stage was 
clearly implicated in constraining the manner in which students at 
different levels learned mathematics; (b) the relationship between 
cognitive organizers and instructional representations of mathematical 
knowledge remained much in need of preliminary investigation; and (c) 
natural categories or naturally occurring concepts had properties which 
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were conceptualized in terms of degree of relatedness, proximity, 
preference, correspondence, and centrality.  
Cognitive Achievement and Cognitive Structure in Piagetian 
Research on Chance and Probability in Adolescents 
Piaget and Inhelder 's (1975) treatment of children's concepts of 
chance and probability provided a taxonomy of response patterns 
associated with developmental stages published earlier (Inhelder 
& Piaget,  1958; Piaget,  1965, 1970b, 1972b). Piaget and Inhelder 
characterized the preoperational stage as the absence of reversibili ty 
in thought.  Reasoning at this level was typically intuitive, pre-
logical,  transductive, syncretic,  and generally insensitive to logical 
contradiction. The child could not distinguish between logical or 
physical certainty and uncertainty. Neither was he able to distinguish 
between what was possible and what was necessary. With t ime and 
experience, preoperational intuitions developed with more differentiated 
modes of thinking. 
The preoperational child could not suspect the true nature of random 
mixture. In Inhelder and Piaget 's (1975) interview tasks, preoperational 
children tried to find within the disorder some hidden order based on 
common properties of elements (e.g.,  spatial,  geometrical,  or ten poral 
similarity) or subjective features of one's own thought (e.g.,  desires,  
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interests).  These children lacked a system of reversible operations. 
Their intuition was a logic dependent upon past experiences. 
Concrete Operations 
Concrete operations was characterized by the presence of reversible 
thought.  Logical classification, relation and quantification became possible.  
The youngster discovered some combinations and permutations empirically 
and incompletely. The possibili t ies could be quantified only if they were 
small in number and static in nature. The mental operations were limited 
to concretely experienced or observed reality.  
During this stage the appearance of logico-mathematical reasoning 
enabled the first  real discovery of the idea of chance. Random mixture 
was conceptualized as an empirical process, no longer as an apparent 
disorder or accidental veiling of hidden order.  The formation of 
deductive operations enabled the youngster to distinguish between the 
necessary and the possible.  Given a class of objects B, where B = A + 
A1  (two subclasses):  
If x is a member of B, i t  is  then either in A or in A1 .  This 
disjunction in i ts concrete form implies both the necessary 
(if x is in B, i t  is  necessarily in A or in A1) and the possible 
(if x is in B, i t  can be in A, but i t  is  also possible that i t  is 
in A1) (Piaget and Inhelder,  1975, p.  226). 
The discovery of deductive necessity allowed the child to conceive 
of the nondeducible character of isolated and uncertain events and to 
distinguish between the necessary and the possible.  
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Physical chance occurred in the form of interactions between 
independent causal sequences. The random mixing of black and white 
marbles within a closed container (Task 1) i l lustrated the interactions 
between elements,  each of which taken alone explained a deductive 
prediction of a final position. However, when all  the elements were 
considered simultaneously, no single element 's position could be 
deduced, because the whole was rendered indeterminate due to the chance 
interactions among individual elements.  The elements interacted when 
the marbles collided. The youngster who became capable of deductive 
reasoning took into account this logical indeterminacy (logical uncertainty),  
and this discovery was the source of the idea of chance. 
Only quasi-probabilistic judgments,  i .  e.  ,  a synthesis of chance 
and quantitative operations, could be produced during concrete operations. 
These judgments were based on simple, static considerations of either 
(a) the comparison of certain parts within the whole, or (b) the compar­
ison of certain parts with the whole, but not both (a) and (b) simultaneously. 
Consequently, an evaluation of proportions could not yet be produced, 
because proportions represented a comparative evaluation between part-
whole combinations or relations between two relations (not t ied to 
c o n c r e t e  r e a l i t y ) .  I n  t h e  r a n d o m  d r a w i n g  o f  c h i p s  t a s k  ( T a s k  Z ) ,  
youngsters realized that some colors contained more discs than other 
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colors,  but they were unable both to compute the ratio between each color 
and the total and to compare these ratios to each other (proportion = ratio 
between ratios).  
Fo rmal Ope rations 
During the formal operational period^ judgments of probability 
became organized on an abstract level.  The use of hypothetical-
deductive thought (reasoning from hypotheses by deducing logical 
implications from them) characterized this stage. Reasoning at this 
level was freed from the constraints of concrete reality by the ability to 
reason propositionally. Propositions were subject-predicate structures 
which combined classes and relations. The description "operations on 
operations" described formal operational thought.  Interpropositional 
operations (transformations of negation, inversion) were performed on 
statements whose intrapropositional content consisted of class and 
relational operations (Dulit ,  1975; Flavell ,  1963; Ginsburg & Opper, 
1979). Possible propositions could be formed and transformed. Reasoning 
transcended concrete reality,  or according to Piaget,  reality became 
subsumed under possibili ty.  Proportions could be quantified and trans­
lated into probabilit ies.  
Piaget and Inhelder described formal operational thinking as 
inductive reasoning which notions of chance and probability represented. 
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Induction was the abstraction of a general principle from specific events,  
reasoning from particular to general.  Deduction reasoned from a general 
principle to specific events,  and the thinking was limited to the concrete 
reality of that general rule.  Inductive processes had no necessary -
constraint.  Formal thought was characterized by a search for principles 
to explain observed operations (not events).  
The final arrangement of black and white marbles (Task 1) was 
unpredictable and indeterminate because of the innumerable possible 
collisions to set into motion by the tipping of the box. Nevetheless,  
once the adolescent learned the operations of permutations, he could 
calculate the possible combinations. By combining proportions with 
permutations, he reasoned about the most likely distribution of marbles 
to predict outcomes and to demonstrate a formal operational understanding 
of probability.  And it  was the indeterminabilityof the outcome that 
signified the formal operational understanding of chance. 
Piaget and Inhelder summarized this process: 
But since chance is not an operative system, we understand 
that the invisible permutations remain fortuitous, that is,  'a) 
instead of being effected according to a systematic order,  
they move pell-mell in all  directions, and especially (b) instead 
of being complete,  they are able to achieve only certain of the 
possibili t ies simultaneously, chance realizes only certain 
possibili t ies,  but creates nothing new and remains necessarily 
within the framework of deduced possibili t ies,  i ts only originality 
is being disordered and incomplete.  In the same way, the drawing 
of pairs of discs from a sack containing several colored sets .  .  .  
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can be done according to all  the combinations of pairs.  Operations 
predict all  the possibili t ies,  some of them coming about by chance, 
which are thus observed ones, but they also must be among the 
original possible cases. In short,  instead of letting chance keep 
its unpredictable character,  incomprehensible as such, the mind 
translates it  into the form of a system of operations, which are 
incomplete and effected with no order.  Chance subsists,  therefore, 
but has been moved to the plane of operations where i t  gains 
intelligibili ty . . . .  The operations lead to the determination of all  
possible cases, even though each of them remains indeterminate 
for its particular realization. Probabilit iy then consists in 
judging isolated cases a fractional coefficient of realization. 
Probability,  therefore, conforms with i ts actual definition, a 
fraction of determination (Piaget and Inhelder,  197 5, pp. 232-3).  
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CHAPTER III 
METHODS OF PROCEDURE 
The research was a developmental study that described the cognitive 
stage achievement and cognitive structures used in mathematical problem 
solving of specified prospective teachers.  A quasi-standardized interview 
determined the protocol for collecting and analyzing the cognitive achieve­
ment data.  A content analysis of solving mathematical problems 
indicated the usage of selected cognitive structures.  Correlations 
(Kendall 's  Tau) measured the strength of association among cognitive 
achievement,  mathematical problem-solving success, and three cognitive 
structures of problem solving. The research design was a variation of 
the one-shot case study in which two observations were made on a 
specified population (Campbell & Stanley, 1963). It  was pre-experimental 
in that i t  did not use an experimental treatment,  randomized sample 
selection, and group comparison. 
Sample 
Forty undergraduate students volunteered for the study. They were 
enrolled in a mathematics education course at a state university in 
North Carolina. The subjects represented prospective teachers.  There 
were four males and 36 females in the sample. The mean age was 
2 5. 5 years,  and the age range was from 19 to 45 years.  The mathe­
matics problems were given to all  students during a reserved class 
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period. The cognitive tasks were conducted in personal interviews outside 
of class at t imes convenient to the students.  
Research Instruments 
Description of the Cognitive Tasks 
Task One: Random Mixture of Marbles.  This task replicated 
Inhelder and Piaget 's (197 5, ch. 1) interview concerning notions of 
chance. Subjects were seated at a table upon which rested a rectangular 
box (ll"x 6 l /2"x 3/4") with a fulcrum under i t  so that i t  could be tipped 
back and forth in a seesaw motion. Five black marbles were initially-
placed on the right side of one end, and five white marbles,  on the left  
side. 
A subject was asked to predict the position of the ten marbles after 
being tipped forward and back one time. The prediction was recorded, 
and the experimenter tipped the box. The subject was asked to observe 
any difference between the prediction and the outcome. This procedure 
was repeated twice. 
A tape recorder was turned on for the cognitive interview. Questions 
asked were taken from Inhelder and Piaget (197 5) and Green (1977). The 
questions focused on the subject 's notions about chance as it  related to 
predicting the final positions of the tipped marbles.  Exemplar questions 
included the following: 
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Will the marbles get more or less mixed up if ten more were 
added, 100 more? What would happen if i t  were tipped ten more 
times, 100 more? Will the marbles ever return to their original 
position, could they, would they ever have to? What does mixing 
mean any way? How does it  work? What controls i t? Could a 
very smart person predict accurately and consistently the final 
positions of the tipped marbles? Why? Are some arrangements 
more likely than others? 
The experimenter probed for full  explanations of the questions. Task one 
interview directions and prediction sheet were attached as Appendix A, 
and transcriptions of three exemplar interviews, as Appendix B. 
Task Two: Random Drawing of Chips. The order of cognitive 
task presentation was reversed for each successive interview. The 
poker chip task replicated Inhelder and Piaget 's (197 5, ch. 5) interview 
concerning notions of probability.  Subjects were seated at a table upon 
which were arranged four horizontal rows of colored discs (1 1/2" poker 
chips),  each row being stacked two discs high. Rows contained the 
following sets of discs: row one (furthest from the subject)^ nine stacks 
of yellow discs; row two, six stacks of red discs; row three, two stacks 
of white discs; and row four,  one stack of blue discs.  The experimenter 
asked the subject to pick the top chip from each stack, to deposit  i t  into 
a paper bag, and to shake the bag to mix the chips up. The remaining 
discs were left  on the table as a model.  The experimenter did not 
mention them again, especially anything about the one-to-one corres­
pondence between the chips on the table and those in the bag. 
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A tape recorder was turned on for the cognitive interview. The 
subject was asked to predict the colors of the two chips that he would 
be asked to pull  out of the bag. The predictions were recorded. The 
subject was instructed to draw out two chips together without looking. 
The procedure was repeated eight more times until  all  chips were 
selected. The questions after each selection focused on the subject 's 
notions about probability as it  related to predicting the colors of 
selected chips (Inhelder &t Piaget,  1975; Green, 1977). Exemplar 
questions included the following: 
Why did you choose that color(s)? What makes it  more or less 
likely than another pair? What are other possibili t ies? Which 
is the best choice, why? What makes predictions work? How 
many chips are left  in the bag? How do you know? Could a 
smart person predict accurately each time, why? What would 
he need to know? Does knowing what you'll  get in the long run 
affect what you may draw on a single turn? 
The experimenter probed for the explanations of the questions. The 
interview directions and the prediction sheet for task two were attached 
as Appendix C, and transcriptions of three exemplar interviews, as 
Appendix D. 
Cognitive Tasks Scoring 
Green's (1978) cognitive scoring instrument was adapted for use 
with young adult subjects in this research. Green replicated Inhelder 
and Piaget 's (1975) interview tasks with children and adolescent subjects.  
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He developed a scoring procedure to overcome these criticisms of the 
Genevan research: (a) the reliability of the results have been questioned 
due to lack of methodological and quantitative rigor; (b) Piaget 's clinical 
method capitalized on individual differences in children, making develop­
mental comparisons or generalizations difficult;  and (c) a lack of specific 
scoring criteria made replication difficult .  
Green (1978) minimized these scoring problems by (a) standarizing 
procedures used in all  interviews, (b) identifying specific test i tems in the 
form of interview questions that represented the stage-related features 
reported by Piaget and Inhelder,  and (c) creating specific scoring criteria 
and decision rules for interpreting the cognitive interview items. Green's 
manual comprised twenty i tems, fifteen verbal and five behavioral i tems. 
Five items tested for preoperational thought,  seven for concrete operations, 
and six for formal reasoning. 
The six concrete-verbal i tems and the five formal-verbal i tems 
were selected for use in this research with Green's permission. The 
items and scoring procedures were modified to test for concrete,  transi­
tional,  and formal operations of young adults.  The cognitive interview 
item and the scoring instructions developed for this research were 
attached as Appendix E. 
Reliability and "Validity. Green (1978) reported an interrater 
reliability for the 20 cognitive i tems calculated by Cohen's (I960) 
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computation of k.  The results ranged from .  72 to 1. 0 on the concrete 
i tems and from .  66 to 1. 0 on the formal items (all  significant at  p < .  01). 
Green selected procedures, described above, to increase the reliability 
of the results,  namely, (a) a quasi-standardized procedure-question 
sequence used during the cognitive interviews, (b) specific test i tems 
and scoring criteria for judging cognitive performance, and (c) testing 
the same children on multiple tasks. Piagetian concepts of cognitive 
stage achievement determined the development of these procedures as 
a measure of construct validity. These procedures were followed in 
this research. 
Mathematical Problem Solving Inventory 
Clark and Reeves (in press) developed problems to measure 
mathematical cognitive structures defined as mathematical concepts 
(Geeslin & Shavelson, 1977). Six mathematical concepts were selected 
from the inventory for use in this research: from algebra, (1) one-to-one 
correspondence, (2) proportion-mixture, (3) spatial logic; and from 
geometry, (4) volume measure, (5) area measure, (6) partit ioning by 
intersecting lines. The mathematical problems selected to test these 
concepts were used with the authors '  permission and described in Appendix 
F. Clark and Reeves identified these problems as the most reliable and 
valid measures of the respective mathematical concepts used with high 
school students.  
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Subjects were given the inventory during a reserved class period 
prior to the scheduling of the cognitive interviews. Subjects were allowed 
five minutes to solve a given problem. They were told to write whatever 
they wanted on the problem page as part of the solution. Secondly, 
subjects were asked to select a strategy from four listed choices that 
best represented their approach to the mathematical problem; a minute 
was allowed for the choice. Therefore, six minutes was allowed for each 
problem, a total of 36 minutes for completion of the inventory. 
Four measures were judged in an analysis of the subjects '  written 
solutions: (a) successful solution, (b) spontaneous labeling of problem-
solving procedure, (c) subject 's choice of mathematical strategy employed, 
and (d) comparison of strategy choice with strategy demonstrated. The 
scoring decision for (a) successful solution was either no, partial  or 
total success. Scoring decisions for (b) labeling and (d) matching 
strategies were judged as yes or no. Five scoring categories indicated 
(c) subject 's identified solution strategy: no choice; concrete,  pictorial 
figure; abstract,  geometric figure; algebraic,  numerical representation; 
and verbal,  logical description. 
Data Analysis Methodology 
The results of the cognitive interviews were used to answer the 
first  research question, the differentiation of cognitive stage achieve­
ment in young adults among concrete,  transitional,  and formal 
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operational levels.  Three measures of reliability were estimated. An 
interjudge scoring reliability (Cohen's k } was established. A correlation 
(Kendall 's  Tau) was calculated for the two cognitive tasks. And a homo­
geneity of performance (Hoyfc's R) was derived. Mean and modal scores 
were reported for each of the three operational levels.  
Success in mathematical problem solving was tested with cognitive 
stage achievement to answer the second research question. The corre­
lation (Kendall 's  Tau b) measured the strength of relationship between 
them. 
The three mathematical problem-solving characteristics of labeling, 
strategy selection, and matching strategies were tested with cognitive 
stage achievement to answer the third research question. The correlation 
(Kendall1  s Tau £) measured the strength of relationship between them. 
And the same characteristics were tested with successful solutions also 
by Kendall 's  Tauc in answering research question four.  
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CHAPTER IV 
RESULTS 
Cognitive Stage Achievement Levels 
Thirteen (33%) of the 40 young adult subjects demonstrated a 
concrete operational level of cognitive achievement on the combined 
two cognitive interview tasks. Sixteen (40%) of the 40 subjects 
performed at a transitional level.  And eleven (27%) of the 40 young 
adults achieved formal operational reasoning. The sample age mean 
was 25.5 years.  
Concrete operational subjects had a mean score of 4.  3 on six 
concrete i tems. Transitional thinkers averaged 5.1, and formal 
achievers 5.7 on the concrete i tems. The sample mean was 5.0 
for the concrete i tems. The mean scores on the five formal items 
revealed a larger distinction: concrete subjects averaged .  5, 
transitional subjects 2. 5, and formal subjects 4.4. The mean 
formal item score for the 40 subjects was 2.4. The results were 
summarized in Table 1. Raw subject data and raw scores on the 
cognitive tasks were listed in Appendices G, H, and I.  
Cognitive Items Interjudge Reliabilit ies 
Interjudge scoring reliabilit ies were computed using Cohen's 
Kappa (I960). It  was used for nominal data of the i tem criteria 
(pass,  fail);  i t  measured the agreement between judges after 
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TABLE 1 
OPERATIONAL LEVELS OF COGNITIVE ACHIEVEMENT: COMBINED 
SCORES FROM COGNITIVE TASKS ONE AND TWO 
Level N Age 6 Concrete Items 5 Formal Items 
Mean Mean Mode Mean Mode 
Concrete 13 24.0 4.3 3, 4 
5, 6 
.  5 
Transitional 16 26.9 5.1 5 2. 5 2, 3 
Formal 11 25.7 5.7 6 4.4 
Total 
Mean 
40 
25.5 5.0 2.4 
controlling for the proportion of agreement expected by chance. The 
scores were listed in Table 2. The items were judged reliably at 
.  005 level of significance or lower. 
TABLE 2 
COGNITIVE ITEM INTERJUDGE RELIABILITES USING 
COHEN'S KAPPA 
Cognitive Item k/l<m a x  ^k _Z P 
Concrete Items: Task 1 and 2 
CI 
00 
.  16 3. 0 .  001 
C2 .  90 .  35 2. 6 .  005 
C3 .  80 .  15 5. 3 < .  001 
C4 .  68 .  02 34. 0 < .  001 
C 5 1.0 .  0 «o * .  001 
C6 1.0 .  0 oO < •
 
o
 
o
 
i—
• 
Formal Items: Tasks 1 and 2 
F1 .45 .  04 11.3 * .  001 
F2 .  71 .  16 4. 4 A  .  001 
F3 .  78 .  16 4.9 <• .  001 
F4 
in o
 .  19 5. 0 <6 .  001 
F5 1.0 .  0 < .  001 
Cognitive Tasks Correlations 
Correlations between the two cognitive tasks tested task independ­
ence. Kendall 's  rank-order correlation coefficient was used since the 
cognitive achievement variable was tabulated as ordinal level of 
measurement (formal achievers scoring more formal items correctly).  
The Tau coefficient for the concrete items of the two tasks was .  53, 
p = .001. The formal items correlation was .40, p = .004. The 
moderate correlations indicated that the tasks were not measuring 
identical cognitive structures of cognitive achievement,and therefore, 
that a combined usage provided a more complete assessment of 
cognitive performance. The results were shown in Table 3. 
TABLE 3 
CORRELATIONS FOR COGNITIVE INTERVIEW TASKS 
Cognitive Stage Level Marble-Colored Chips Tasks 
Kendall Tau £ 
Concrete Stage Items .  53 .  001 
Formal Stage Items .  40 .  004 
Homogeneity of Performance 
The operational level homogeneity of performance on the concrete 
and formal task items was tested by Hoyt 's R_ (1941). Hoyt adapted the 
Kudo r-Richard son formula #20 to test the consistency of performance 
for each subject within a given category. Hoyt 's reliability formula 
was designed for binary (pass,  fail)  data used in the cognitive task 
item scoring. The results were displayed in Table 4. The concrete 
subjects '  performance on the concrete i tems showed a large within -
cell  variation (1.73) which indicated a large range of cognitive 
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TABLE 4 
COGNITIVE OPERATIONAL LEVEL HOMOGENEITY OF PERFORMANCE 
ON COGNITIVE ITEMS (TASKS ONE AND TWO COMBINED) MEASURED 
BY HOYT'S R 
Operational Level Concrete Items Formal Items 
W/in Var. R W/in Var. R 
Concrete 1.73 .73 .27 .99 
Transitional .47 .93 .26 .99 
Formal .42 .93 .25 .99 
Between Var. :  6.41 43.69 
Unweighted Mean .87 .26 
W/in Var. :  
Unweighted Mean Rj .86 .99 
achievement.  Transitional and formal subjects showed only moderate 
variation (.47, .42).  The mean within-cell  variation on the concrete 
i tems was moderate (6.41) which indicated moderate variation among 
the three groups of subjects on the concrete i tems. The low within-
cell  variation of all  groups (.  27, .26, .25) on the formal items 
indicated high homogeneity of performance within each group,.  and 
the between variance (43. 69) indicated large differences between 
the performance of the three groups on the formal items (partially 
explained by the scoring instrument that identified the groupings).  
The ft  values were high and indicated homogeneous performance 
of the three groups on both concrete and formal items. 
Cognitive Achievement and Mathematical Problem Solving Success 
The relationship between cognitive achievement and successful 
mathematical problem solving was measured using Kendall 's  Tau b 
since the variables were scored as ordinal level measures. A cross-
tabulation of achievers and problem solvers was computed for each of 
the six mathematical problems. Table 5 displayed the cross-tabula­
tion of problem #4 as an example (using SPSS format,  Nie, Hull,  
Jenkins, Steinbrennei;  & Bent,  197 5).  In the example, the test 
statistic resulted in a significant moderately high correlation (.36, 
p < .01) which indicated that the two variables (levels of cognitive 
achievement and degree of math success) were not independently related 
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TABLE 5 
A CROSS-TABULATION EXAMPLE OF COGNITIVE STAGE AND 
SUCCESSFUL MATHEMATICAL PROBLEM SOLVING 
Mathematical Problem #4: Partit ioning by Intersecting Lines 
N = 40 Mathematical Problem Solving Success 
Cognitive Stage Levels None Partial Complete Total 
Concrete 2 11 0 13 
T ransitional 1 14 1 16 
F o rmal 
Total 
Kendall 's  Tau B = .  36 
33 
Significance = .  007 
11  
40 
in solving this math problem. Table 6 l isted the correlations and levels 
of significance for all  six problems-; raw scores were listed in Appendix J.  
Since four of the six problems showed a significantly (p < .  05) strong 
relation, cognitive achievement levels and mathematical problem solving 
success were not independent of each other.  
TABLE 6 
INDEPENDENCE OF COGNITIVE STAGE AND SUCCESS IN 
MATHEMATICAL PROBLEM SOLVING 
Mathematical Problems Cognitive Stage and Success in 
Mathematical Problem Solving 
Kendall 's  Tau b p 
Algebraic 
Prob. 3 .24 .04* 
Prob. 5 .25 .04* 
Prob. 6 - .13 .19 
Geometric 
Prob. 1 .19 .09 
Prob. 2 .36 .01* 
Prob. 4 .36 .01* 
*Significant,  p < .05 
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TABLE 7 
INDEPENDENCE OF COGNITIVE STAGE AND USAGE OF LABELING 
IN MATHEMATICAL PROBLEM SOLVING 
Mathematical Problems Cognitive Stage and Usage of Labeling 
Kendall 's  Tau C JJ_ 
Algebraic 
Prob. 3 - .04 .34 
Prob. 5 - .  06 .20 
Prob. 6 .05 .37 
Geometric 
Prob. 1 .28 .05* 
Prob. 2 - .11 .24 
Prob. 4 - .01 .  49 
^Significant,  p < .  05 
Cognitive Achievement and Mathematical 
Problem-Solving Characteristics 
The relation was tested between cognitive operational levels and 
three cognitive characteristics of mathematical problem solving: (a) 
subject 's spontaneous labeling of a figure while solving a problem, 
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TABLE 8 
INDEPENDENCE OF COGNITIVE STAGE AND MATHEMATICAL 
PROBLEM SOLVING STRATEGIES 
Mathematical Problems Cognitive Stage and Solution Strategies 
Kendall 's  Tau C P 
Algebraic 
Prob. 3 - .08 .28 
Prob. 5 .08 .27 
Prob. 6 .21 .05* 
Geometric 
Prob. 1 - .19 .09 
Prob. 2 .04 .37 
Prob. 4 .04 .37 
'^Significant,  p < .05 
(b) subject 's choice of a solution strategy, and (c) the match between 
the solution strategy and one's chosen strategy. Kendall 's  Tau C was 
the test statistic used to measure the strength of the relationships. Tables 
7, 8,  and 9 displayed the results of the correlational tests for cognitive 
achievement and the three characteristics,  respectively. The raw 
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TABLE 9 
INDEPENDENCE OF COGNITIVE STAGE AND MATCHING OF 
MATHEMATICAL PROBLEM-SOLVING STRATEGIES 
USED AND CHOSEN 
Mathematical Problems Cognitive Stage and Matching Strategies 
Kendall 's  Tau C p 
Algebraic 
Prob. 3 .01 .49 
Prob. 5 .03 .42 
Prob. 6 - .24 .05* 
Geometric 
Prob. 1 .01 .47 
Prob. 2 - .04 .41 
Prob. 4 .17 .15 
^Significant,  p < .05 
scores for these relationships were attached in Appendices K, L, and M. 
The results indicated that cognitive achievement was independent 
and not related to the characteristics of mathematical problem solving 
(labeled figure, chosen solution strategy, and i ts match with used strategy). 
TABLE 10 
INDEPENDENCE OF SUCCESS AND USAGE OF LABELING IN 
MATHEMATICAL PROBLEM SOLVING 
Mathematical Problems Success and Labeling in Mathematical 
Problem Solving 
Kendall 's  Tau C 
Algebraic 
Prob. 3 - .04 .37 
Prob. 5 - .05 .21 
Prob. 6 .12 .22 
Geometric 
Prob. 1 .32 .  03* 
Prob. 2 .02 .45 
Prob. 4 .  04 .  36 
^Significance, p < .05 
Only one of six problems in each of the three tests showed a strong 
relationship, p < .  05. 
Success and Characteristics in Mathematical Problem Solving 
The relation was tested between mathematical problem-solving 
success and the problem-solving characteristics described above. 
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TABLE 11 
INDEPENDENCE OF SUCCESS AND STRATEGIES USED IN 
MATHEMATICAL PROBLEM SOLVING 
Mathematical Problems Success and Strategies Used in Mathematical 
Problem Solving 
Kendall 's  Tau C p 
Algebraic 
Prob. 3 .19 .09 
Prob. 5 .15 .09 
Prob. 6 .18 .08 
Geometric 
Prob. 1 - .2 6 .  03* 
Prob. 2 .09 .29 
Prob. 4 - .  03 .39 
^Significance, p < .05 
Kendall 's  Tau C was used. The results were summarized in Tables 10, 
11, and 12. The results indicated an independent relationship between 
success and the selected strategies of mathematical problem solving. 
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TABLE 12 
INDEPENDENCE OF SUCCESS AND MATCHING STRATEGIES 
(USED AND CHOSEN) IN MATHEMATICAL PROBLEM SOLVING 
Mathematical Problems Success and Matching Strategies in 
Mathematical Problem Solving 
Kendall 's  Tau C p 
Algebraic 
Prob. 3 .31 • 03* 
Prob. 5 .07 .26 
Prob. 6 .39 .01* 
Geometric 
Prob. 1 • 05 .  38 
Prob. 2 - .16 .  13 
Prob. 4 .21 .03* 
^Significant,  p < .  05 
The tests with labeled figures and selected solution strategies revealed 
only one of six problems significant at  the .  05 level;  the test for matched 
strategy showed three of six problems significant at  .  05. 
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CHAPTER Y 
DISCUSSION OF THE RESULTS 
Three operational levels of cognitive stage achievement were 
described in this research using cognitive developmental interviews. 
The relation among cognitive achievement,  successful mathematical 
soluticm, and three characteristics of mathematical problem solving 
were tested using math problems representing six math concepts* 
Young adults,  specified as prospective teachers,  comprised the sample. 
Cognitive Stage Achievement Levels 
The combined scoring of two cognitive interview tasks on chance 
and probability replicated Green's (1978) and Piaget and Inhelder 's 
(197 5) investigations of child and adolescent reasoning. The results 
of this research with 40 young adult subjects revealed that only 27% 
achieved a consolidated level of formal operations. The findings 
contradicted the initial  observations of adolescents by Inhelder and 
Piaget (1958) who theorized that all  normally developed humans 
achieved formal operations capability by age 15. Jackson (1965), 
Lovell  (1961b), and Webb (1974) have replicated Piagetian constructs 
of formal operations successfully. Yet Berry and Dasen (1974) and 
Dulit  (1975) reported a lack of formal behavior in cross-sectional 
studies.  Neimark (1975b) concluded that the formal operations stage 
was described incompletely. Piaget (1972) refined his initial  
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observation in acknowledging the lack of abstract reasoning among 
many adolescents.  He attributed this fact to a lack of appropriate 
environmental experiences rather than an impossiblity of cognitive 
development.  The results of this research with late adolescents 
and young adults were compatible with earlier studies that reported 
incomplete formal operational achievement by the completion of 
adolescence. 
Forty percent of the college subjects demonstrated partial formal 
operations and represented a transitional operational level.  This 
finding related to the results of Kuhn et al .  (197 5),  who reported a 
distinct group of adolescents whose thinking was transitional between 
concrete and formal thought.  Thirty-three percent of the subjects did 
not achieve beyond concrete operations. This finding was similar to 
a series of cognitive achievement studies by Renner et al .  (1976) fwho 
reported that approximately one-half of the college freshmen interviewed 
reasoned below formal operations. 
The cognitive interview instrument was adapted from Green (1978) 
for use with young adult subjects.  It  provided a quasi-standardized 
approach to the interview protocol,  cognitive test i tems and scoring, 
thereby increasing procedural reliability.  Additionally, three measures 
of reliability were estimated. An interjudge scoring reliability (p < .  01) 
indicated a consistent understanding of cognitive i tem constructs and its 
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application used in scoring. Correlations between the two cognitive 
tasks indicated a moderate degree of relationship (.  53 for concrete 
i tems, .40 for formal items, p <. 01); the tasks measured different 
but associated traits of operational thought.  The combined usage 
provided a more complete assessment of cognitive performance. 
Homogeneity of performance tests indicated each of the three 
operational level groups behaved consistently and differentiated 
its thinking behavior from the other two levels.  
Success in Mathematical Problem Solving 
The relation between the operational levels of cognitive achieve­
ment and successful mathematical problem solving was examined in 
this research. The results showed that the variables were not 
independently related as measured by an inventory of six mathematics 
problems representing different math concepts.  Four of the six 
problems resulted in moderate correlations (range .  24 to .  36, p < .  05),  
two of three algebra concepts and two of three geometry concepts.  
Cognitive stage achievement and successful math problem solving 
were associated for young adults.  
Bruner (I960) implied that anything could be learned if i t  were 
explained in a structure which matched the cognitive level of the 
student.  Geeslin (1972) and Shavelson (1972) defined mathematical 
cognitive structure as the structure inherent in mathematical content 
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or concepts.  The content structure of the mathematical problems used 
in the research instrument (Clark & Reeves, in press) consisted of 
abstract word problems which approximated the formal operational 
cognitive structures.  The formal achievers were the most successful 
problem solvers,  and the concrete thinkers were least successful.  
The results indicated that the matching of content structure with 
the more general cognitive structures appropriate at the subjects '  
cognitive stage level resulted in successful mathematical solutions. 
The match of content structure and cognitive structure was demonstrated 
in other studies (Lovell ,  1976; Moyer, 1978; Scandura, 1967; Schulman, 
1970; Suppes, 1967). This match has been argued pedagogically by-
educators (Bloom, 1956; Gagne, 1967; Macdonald et al .  ,  1973; Schwab, 
1962). 
Three Characteristics of Problem Solving 
Both cognitive stage achievement and successful math problem 
solving were tested for the strength of association with three charac­
teristics of problem solving: labeled figure, chosen strategy, and its 
match with used strategy. They were measured by six mathematical 
problems representing different math concepts.  The results showed 
that the problem solving characteristics were independent of both 
cognitive stage achievement and mathematical problem solving success. 
The three characteristics were selected from Clark & Reeves's 
(in press) l ist  of strategies that help children learn mathematics.  
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Specifically, the operational definitions of the strategies were found to 
be independent of cognitive stage and successful math solutions: (a) the 
spontaneous labeling of a math problem or figure while deriving the 
solution, or not doing so; (b) choosing a strategy to represent how 
one solved a problem from five possibili t ies: no choice, pictorial 
figure, geometric figure, numeric formula, verbal description; (c) 
the matching of one's chosen strategy with the judge's identification 
of the strategy demonstrated. 
The nonrelatedness of these operationally defined mathematical 
strategies with the constructs cognitive achievement and mathematical 
cognitive structure could have accounted for the results.  Geeslin and 
Shavelson (197 5) analyzed the representation of a mathematical structure 
in students '  cognitive structures and did not find that learning mathe­
matical structure (concepts) guaranteed successful solution. Specific 
strategies did not always lead to singular right answers. 
As another explanation, Ausubel and Sullivan (1970) discussed 
problem solving as a multidimensional process that could not be 
equated with any one factor that influenced its development or limited 
to any one of i ts three levels—trial-and-error,  hypothesis testing, or 
insight.  Gallagher (1964) and Stevenson et al .  (1968) found intelligence 
to be only a part of problem solving ability.  The test for problem-
solving characteristics using only the three characteristics was not 
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a multidimensional operational definition of problem solving. Piaget 
(1967) described an essential distinction between formal and concrete 
operations as the ability to solve problems in different ways. The 
result  from a paper»and-pencil  test used in the research did not 
indicate that there was a difference among operational levels of 
cognitive achievement in the use of spontaneous labeling, pattern 
of chosen solution strategy, or congruence in chosen and used 
strategies.  Distinctions might have appeared in a cognitive interview 
in which the subject was asked to display the reasoning instead of 
relying on an analysis of a written test to reveal i t .  
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CHAPTER VI 
SUMMARY, CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
Three operational levels of cognitive stage achievement have 
been identified by Piagetian cognitive interviews for 40 young adult 
(age mean = 25. 5 years) prospective teachers: 27% achieved formal 
operations, 40% demonstrated a partial or transitional achievement 
towards formal thought,  and 33% did not perform beyond concrete 
operations. The relation among cognitive stage achievement,  
successful mathematical problem solutions, and three characteristics 
of problem solving used in mathematics have been tested using 
Kendall 's  Tau. Cognitive stage achievement and successful mathe­
matical problem solution were not independently related. Three 
characteristics of problem solving used in mathematics (spontaneous 
figure labeling, solution strategy selection and its use) were tested as 
independently related both to cognitive stage achievement levels and to 
degree of success in mathematical problem solving. 
Conclusions 
1.  Young adults demonstrated differential achievement among 
concrete,  transitional,  and formal levels of cognitive stage. 
2. Cognitive stage achievement and successful mathematical 
problem solving were associated constructs.  
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3. The three characteristics of problem solving used in 
mathematics--spontaneous figure labeling, chosen solution strategy, 
and its match with demonstrated strategy--are not related to cognitive 
stage achievement or successful mathematical problem solving. 
Recommendations 
1.  A cross-sectional investigation of cognitive stage achievement 
in young adults.  
2.  A longitudinal investigation of cognitive stage achievement 
in young adults through middle adulthood. 
3.  An investigation of cognitive stage achievement in young 
adults using multiple cognitive tasks. 
4.  A study of the relation among (a) cognitive stage achievement 
of teachers,  (b) their mastery of cognitive structures (concepts) of 
their disciplines, and (c) their applied understanding of the cognitive" 
structures used by their pupils.  
5.  Development,  implementation, and evaluation of experimental 
curriculum in higher education with explicit  developmental goals for 
cognitive achievement through problem-solving methodologies.  
67 
BIBLIOGRAPHY 
Alexander,  T. ,  Roodin, P. ,  & Gorman, B. Developmental psychology. 
New York: D. Van Nostrand, 1980. 
Arlin, P. K. Cognitive development in adulthood: A fifth stage? 
Developmental Psychology, 197 5, 11, 602-606. 
Ausubel,  D. P. ,  & Sullivan, E. V. Theory and problems of child 
development (2nd ed. ).  New York: Grune & Stratton, 1970. 
Baltes,  P.  B. ,  & Labouvie, G. V. Adult development of intellectual 
performance: Description, explanation, modification. In C. 
Eisdorfer & M. P. Lawton (Eds. ),  The psychology of adult  
development and aging. Washington, D. C. :  American 
Psychological Association, 1973. 
Baltes,  P. B.,  Reese, H. W. ,  & Nesselroade, J .  R. Life-span 
developmental psychology: Introduction to research methods. 
Monterey, Calif.  :  Brooks-Cole Publishing Co.,  1977. 
Battro, A. M. Piaget:  Dictionary of terms. New York: Pergamon 
Press,  1973. 
Berry, J.  W. ,  & Dasen, P. (Eds. ).  Culture and cognition: Readings 
in cross-cultural psychology. London: Methuen, 1974. 
Blasi,  A.,  Hoeffel,  E. Adolescence and formal operations. Human 
Development,  1974, JT7, 344-363. 
Bloom. B. S. (Ed. ) Taxonomy of educational objectives, the 
class J. f i  c at ion of educational goals,  handbook I:  Cognitive 
domain. New York: David McKay Co. ,  1956. 
Brainerd, C. J .  Judgments and explanations as criteria for the presence 
of cognitive structures.  Psychological Bulletin, 1973, 7_9, 172-179. 
Brainerd, C. J.  Neo-Piagetian training experiments revisited: Is there 
any support for the cognitive-developmental stage hypothesis? 
Cognition, 1974, 2, 349-370. 
68 
Brainerd, C. J.  "Stage, 1 1  "structure, "  and developmental theory. 
In G. Steiner (Ed. ),  The psychology of the twentieth century. 
Munich: Kindler,  1976. 
Brainerd, C. J.  Piaget 's theory of intelligence. Englewood Cliffs,  
N. J .  :  Prentice-Hall,  1978. 
Bruner,  J .  S. Inhelder and Piaget 's "The growth of logical thinking": 
I .  A psychologist 's  viewpoint.  British Journal of Psychology, 
1958, _50, 363-370. 
Bruner,  J .  S. The process of education. New York: Vintage Books, 
I 9 6 0 .  
Bruner, J .  S. The course of cognitive growth. American Psychologist,  
1964, 1_9, 1-15. 
Bruner,  J .  S. Toward a theory of instruction. Cambridge, Mass. :  
Belknap Press of Harvard University Press,  1966. 
Bruner,  J .  S. The relevance of education. New York: W, W. Norton, 
1973. 
Bruner,  J .  S. ,  Olver,  R. R. & Greenfield, P.  M. Studies in cognitive 
growth. New York: John Wiley 8i Sons, 1966. 
Buchler,  J .  (Ed. ) Philosophical writings of Pierce. New York: Doner, 
1955. 
Campbell,  D. T. & Stanley, J .  C. Experimental and quasi-experimental 
designs for research. Chicago: Rand McNally, 1963. 
Clark, T. B. Cognitive development,  mathematics achievement,  
language competency and creativity in young children. Manuscript 
submitted for publication, 1979. 
Clark, T. B. ,  & Reeves, C. A. Mathematical processes in problem 
solving. Santa Monica, Calif.  :  Goodyear Publishing Co. ,  in press.  
Cohen, J .  A coefficient of agreement for nominal scales.  Educational 
and Psychological Measurement,  I960, 20, 37-46. 
69 
Combs, A. W. ,  Blume, R. A. ,  Newman, A. J.  ,  & Wass, H. L. The 
professional education of teachers (2nd ed. ).  Boston: Allyn and 
Bacon, 1974. 
Craig, G. J.  Human development (2nd ed. ).  Englewood Cliffs,  N. J.  :  
Prentice-Hall,  1980. 
Craig, R. C. Directed versus independent discovery of established 
relations. Journal of Educational Psychology, 1956, 47, 223-234. 
Danner,  F. W. ,  & Day, M. C. Eliciting formal operations. Child 
Development,  1977, 48, 1600-1606. 
Dewey, J .  Democracy and education. New York: Macmillan, 1916. 
Dewey, J .  How we think. Boston: Heath, 1933. 
Dewey, J .  Experience and education. New York: MacMillan, 1938. (a) 
Dewey, J .  Logic: The theory of inquiry. New York: Henry, Holt & Co. 
1938. (b) 
Dewey, J .  ,  & Dewey, E. Schools of tomorrow. New York: E. P. 
Dutton, 1915. 
Dulit ,  E. Adolescent thinking a la Piaget:  The formal stage. Journal of 
Youth and Adolescence, 197 5, _1, 281-301. 
Eimas, P. D. Information processing in problem solving as a function of 
developmental level and stimulus saliency. Developmental Psychology, 
1970, 2, 224-229. 
Elkind, D. Egocentricism in adolescence. Child Development,  1967, 
38, 1025-1033. 
Elkind, D. Conservation and concept formation. In D. Elkind & J .  Flavell  
(Eds. ),  Studies in cognitive development: Essays in honor of Jean 
Piaget.  New York: Oxford University Press,  1969. 
Elkind, D. Children and adolescents: Interpretative essays on Jean Piaget 
(2nd ed. ).  New York: Oxford University Press,  1974. 
70 
Elkind,  D.  Child development and education.  New York:  Oxford 
Universi ty Press,  1976.  
Elkind,  D.  ,  & Flavell ,  J .  (Eds.  ).  Studies in cognit ive development:  
Essays in honor of Jean Piaget .  New York:  Oxford Universi ty 
Press,  1969.  
Erikson,  E.  H. Identi ty,  youth and cr is is .  New York:  W. W. Norton,  
1968 
Fawcett ,  H.  P.  The mature of proof.  Thir teenth Yearbook,  National  
Council  of  Teachers of Mathematics.  New York:  Columbia 
Universi ty Press,  1938.  
Fein,  G.  G.  Child development.  Englewood Cliffs ,  N.  J . :  Prentice-
Hall ,  1978.  
Feldman,  C.  F.  ,  Lee,  B.  ,  McLean,  D. ,  Pi l lemer,  D.  ,  & Murray,  F.  
The Development of adaptive intel l igence.  San Francisco:  
Jossey-Bass,  1974.  
Fischbein,  E.  The intui t ive sources of probabil is t ic  thinking in children.  
Boston:  D.  Reidel ,  1975.  
Flavell ,  J .  The developmental  psychology of Jean Piaget .  New York:  
D. Van Nostrand,  1963.  
Flavell ,  J .  H. Concept  formation.  In P.  H. Mussen (Ed.  ) ,  Carmichael 's  
manual  of chi ld development (3d ed.  ) .  New York:  Wiley,  1970.  
Flavell ,  J .  H. Stage-related propert ies  of cognit ive development.  
Cognit ive Psychology,  1971,  2,  421-453.  
Flavell ,  J .  Cognit ive development.  Englewood Cliffs ,  N.  J .  :  Prentice-
Hall ,  1977.  
Flavell ,  J .  H. ,  & Wohlwil l ,  J .  F.  Formal and functional  aspects  of  
cognit ive development.  In D.  Elkind & J .  H. Flavell  (Eds.  ) ,  
Studies in cognitive development: Essays in honor of Jean Piaget.  
New York: Oxford University Press,  1969. 
Ford,  G. W. ,  fk Pugno,  L.  (Eds.  ) .  The structure of knowledge and the 
curriculum. Chicago:  Rand McNally,  1964.  
71 
Furth,  H.  Piaget  and knowledge.  Englewood Cliffs ,  New Jersey:  
Prentice-Hall ,  1969.  
Furth,  H. G.  Piaget  for  teachers.  Englewood Cliffs ,  N.  J .  :  Prentice-
Hall ,  1970.  
Furth,  H.  G.  & Wachs,  H.  Thinking goes to school:  Piaget 's  theory in 
pract ice.  New York:  Oxford Universi ty Press,  197 5.  
Gagne,  R.  M. The acquisi t ion of knowledge.  In J .  M. Scandura (Ed.  ) ,  
Research in mathematics education.  Washington,  D.  C.  :  National  
Council  of  Teachers of Mathematics,  1967.  
Gagne,  R.  M. Contributions of learning to human development.  
Psychological  Review,,  1968,  75,  177-191.  
Gallagher,  J .  J .  Productive thinking.  In M. L.  Hoffman & L.  W. 
Hoffman (Eds.  ) ,  Review of chi ld development research (Vol.  1) .  
New York:  Russel l  Sage Foundation,  1964.  
Gallagher,  J .  M. ,  Mansfield,  R.  S.  Cognit ive development in 
adolescence (chap.  6) .  In J .  F. Adams (Ed.  ) ,  Understanding 
adolescence:  Current  developments in adolescent  psychology 
(4th ed.  ) .  Boston:  Allyn & Bacon,  1980.  
Gardner,  H.  Thought during adolescence.  In Developmental  psychology:  
An introduction (chap.  13).  Boston:  Lit t le ,  Brown Co. ,  1978.  
Garskof,  B.  E.  ,  & Houston,  J .  P.  Measurement of verbal  relatedness:  
An idiographic approach.  Psychological  Review, 1963,  70,  277-288.  
Geesl in,  W. E.  An exploratory analysis  of content  s tructure and 
cognit ive s tructure in the context  of  formative evaluat ion of a  
mathematics curriculum. Unpublished doctoral  dissertat ion,  
Stanford Universi ty,  1973.  
Geesl in,W. E.  ,  Shavelson,  R.  J .  An exploratory analysis  of the 
representat ion of a  mathematical  s tructure in s tudents '  cognit ive 
s tructures.  American Educational  Research Journal ,  1975,  12,  
21-39.  
Gibney,  T. ,  & Karns,  E.  Mathematics education--  1955-1975:  A 
summary of the f indings.  Educational  Leadership:  Journal  of the 
Associat ion for  Supervision and Curriculum Development,  1979,  
36,  356-359.  
72 
Ginsburg,  H.  ,  & Opper,  S.  Piaget 's  theory of intel lectual  development 
(2nd ed.  ) .  Englewood Cliffs ,  N.  J .  :  Prentice-Hall ,  1978.  
Gould,  R.  L.  Transformations,  growth and change in adult  l i fe .  New 
York:  Simon & Schuster ,  1978.  
Gray,  W. M. Children 's  performance on logical ly equivalent  Piagetian 
tasks and wri t ten tasks.  Educational  Research Monographs.  
Universi ty of Dayton (Ohio),  1970.  
Green,  M. G. Scoring manual:  Children 's  concepts  of  chance and 
probabil i ty.  In Cognit ive development and the comprehension 
of speaker uncertainty.  Unpublished doctoral  dissertat ion,  
Harvard Universi ty,  1977,  
Green,  M. G. Structure and sequence in children 's  concepts  of  chance 
and probabil i ty:  A replicat ion study of Piaget  and Inhelder .  Child 
Development,  1978,  49,  1045-1053.  
Green,  M. G. The developmental  relat ion between cognit ion s tage and 
comprehension of speaker uncertainty.  Child Development,  1979,  
J50,  666-674.  
Gwynn,  J .  M.,  & Chase,  J .  B.  ,  Jr .  Curriculum principles and social  
t rends (4th ed.  ) .  New York:  Macmillan,  1969.  
Hancock,  R.  R.  Cognit ive factors  and their  interact ion with instruct ional  
mode.  Journal  for  Research in Mathematics Education,  1975,  6,  
37-50.  
Holt ,  J .  C.  How children learn.  New York:  Pi tman,  1967.  
Horn,  J .  L.  Organizat ion of data on l i fe-span development of human 
abil i t ies .  In L.  R.  Goulet  & P.  B.  Baltes (Eds.  ) ,  Life-span 
developmental  psychology:  Research and theory.  New York:  
Academic Press,  1970.  
Horn,  J .  L.  ,  & Cattel ,  R.  B.  Age differences in f luid and crystal l ized 
intel l igence.  Acta Psychologica,  1967,  26,  107-129.  
Hoyt,  C.  Test  rel iabi l i ty obtained by analysis  of  variance.  Psychometrika,  
1941,  6,  153-160.  
73 
Inhelder ,  B. ,  & Chipman,  H.  H. (Eds.)  Piaget  and his  school:  A reader 
in developmental  psychology.  Berl in:  Springer-Verlag,  1976.  
Inhelder ,  B.  ,  & Piaget ,  J .  The growth of logical  thinking from 
c-hildhood to adolescence.  New York:  Basic Books,  1958.  
Inhelder ,  B.  ,  & Piaget ,  J .  The early growth of logic in the child.  
New York:  W. W. Norton,  1969.  
Inhelder ,  B.  ,  & Matalon,  B.  The study of problem solving and thinking.  
In P.  H. Mussen (Ed.  ) ,  Handbook of research methods in child 
development.  New York:  .John Wiley Sons,  I960.  
Jackson,  S.  The growth of logical  thinking in normal and sub-normal 
children.  Bri t ish Journal  of  Educational  Psychology,  196 5,  35,  
255-258.  
James,  G. ,  & James,  R.  C.  (Eds.)  Mathematics dict ionary.  Princeton,  
N.  J . :  D. Van Nostrand Co.  ,  1959.  
Kastenbaum, R.  Humans developing:  A l i fespan perspective.  Boston :  
Allyn Bacon,  1979.  
Kerl inger,  F.  N. Foundations of behavioral  research (2nd ed.  ) .  New 
York:  Holt ,  Rinehart  & Winston,  1973.  
Kilpatr ick,  J .  Problem solving in mathematics.  Review of Educational  
Research,  1969,  39,  523-534.  
Klausmein,  H.  J .  ,  fk Allen,  P.  S.  Cognit ive development of chi ldren and 
youth:  A longitudinal  s tudy.  New York:  Academic Press,  1978.  
Kohlberg,  L.  Stage and sequence:  The cognit ive-developmental  approach 
to social izat ion.  In D.  Goslin (Ed.  ) ,  Handbook of social izat ion 
theory and research.  Chicago:  Rand McNally,  1969.  
Kohlberg,  L.  Continuit ies  in childhood and adult  moral  development 
revisi ted.  In P.  B.  Baltes &; K.  W. Schaie (Eds.  ) ,  Life-span 
developmental  psychology:  Personali ty and social izat ion.  New 
York:  Academic Press,  1973.  
Kohlberg,  L.  ,  & Mayer,  R.  Development as  the aim of education.  
Harvard Educational  Review, 1972,  42,  449-496.  
74 
Kuhn, D. ,  & Angeler ,  J .  An experimental  s tudy of the development of  
formal operat ional  thought .  Unpublished manuscript ,  Columbia 
Universi ty,  1975.  
Kuhn,  D. ,  Langer,  J . ,  Kohlberg,  L.  ,  & Haan,  N.  S.  The development 
of  formal operat ions in logical  and moral  judgment.  Genetic  
Psychology Monographs,  1977,  95,  97-188.  
Langer,  J .  Theories of development.  New York:  Holt ,  Rinehart  & 
Winston,  1969.  
Lerner,  R.  M. ,  & Spanier ,  G.  B.  Cognit ive development in adolescence 
(chap.  9) .  In Adolescent  development:  A l i fe-span perspective.  
New York:  McGraw-Hil l ,  1980.  
Leskow, S.  ,  & Smock,  C.  D.  Developmental  changes in problem 
solving strategies:  Permutat ions.  Developmental  Psychology,  
1970,  2,  412-422.  
Levi-Strauss,  C.  Structural  anthropology.  New York:  Basic Books,  
1963.  
Levi-Strauss,  C.  Elementary structures of kinship (Rev,  ed.  ) .  
Boston:  Beacon,  1969.  
Levinson,  D.  J .  The seasons of a  man's  l i fe .  New York:  Knopf,  1978.  
Lewin,  K.  Field theory in social  science.  New York:  Harper,  
1951 
Lovell ,  K.  R.  A fol low-up study of Inhelder  and Piaget 's  "The growth 
of logical  thinking from childhood to adolescence.  "  Bri t ish Journal  
of  Psychology,  1961,  52,  143-153.  (a)  
Lovell ,  K.  R.  The growth of basic mathematical  and scientif ic  concepts  
in children.  New York:  Philosophical  Library,  1961.  (b)  
Lovell ,  K.  R.  Intel lectual  growth and understanding mathematics.  Journal  
for  Research in Mathematics Education,  1976,  1_,  164-182.  
Lovell ,  K.  Rv  h Butterworth,  I .  B.  Abil i t ies  underlying the understanding 
of proport ionali ty.  Mathematics Teaching,  1966,  37,  5-9.  
Lunzer,  E.  A. Problems of formal reasoning in text  s i tuat ions.  
Monographs of the Society for  Research in Child Development.  
1965,  30(2),  19-46.  
75 
Lunzer,  E.  A. Formal reasoning.  In E.  A. Lunzer & J .  F.  Morris  
(Eds.) ,  Development in human learning.  New York:  American 
Elsevier ,  1968.  
Macdonald,  J .  B.  ,  Wolfson,  B.  J .  ,  fk Zaret ,  E.  Reschooling society:  
A conceptual  model .  Washington,  D.C.:  Associat ion for  
Supervision & Curriculum Development,  1973.  
Maier ,  H. W. Three theories of chi ld development (3rd ed.  ) .  New 
York:  Harper & Row, 1978.  
Martorano,  S.  C.  The development of  formal operat ional  thought .  
Unpublished doctoral  dissertat ion,  Rutgers Universi ty,  1974.  
Mayer,  R.  ,  & Greeno,  J .  G. Acquiring cognit ive s tructure by discovery 
and role learning.  Journal  of Educational  Psychology,  1973,  
64,  85-97.  
McCollum, J .  A.  Ah Hah! The inquiry process of generat ing and 
test ing knowledge.  Santa Monica,  Calif . :  Goodyear,  1978.  
McGhee,  P.  E.  The role of operat ional  thinking in children 's  
comprehension and appreciat ion of humor.  Child Development,  
1971,  42,  733-744.  
Moyer,  J .  C.  The relat ionship between the mathematical  s tructure of 
Euclidean transformations and the spontaneously developed 
cognit ive s tructures of young children.  Journal  for  Research in 
Mathematics Education,  1978,  9. ,  83-92.  
Neimark,  E.  D. Intel lectual  development during adolescence.  In 
F.  D. Horowitz (Ed.  ) ,  Review of chi ld development research 
(Vol.  4) .  Chicago:  Universi ty of Chicago Press,  1975.  (a)  
Neimark,  E.  D. Longitudinal  development of formal operat ions 
thought .  Genetic  Psychological  Monographs,  197 5,  91,  171-22 5.  
(b)  
Neimark,  E.  Dv& Lewis,  N.  The development of logical  problem-
solving s trategies.  Child Development,  1967,  38,  107-117.  
Nelson,  V. L.  An analyt ical  s tudy of chi ld rearing.  Child Development,  
7,  95-114,  1936.  
Nie,  N.  H. ,  Hull ,  C.  H.  ,  Jenkins,  J .  G.  ,  Steinbrenner,  K. ,  & Bent ,  
D.  H.  Stat is t ical  package for  the social  sciences (2nd ed.  ) .  
New York:  McGraw-Hil l ,  1975.  
76 
Papalia ,  D.  E.  ,  & Bielby,  D.  Cognit ive functioning in middle and 
old age adults .  Human Development,  1974,  17,  424-443.  
Paplia ,  D.  E.  ,  & Olds,  S.  W. A child 's  world:  Infancy through 
adolescence (2nd ed.  ) .  New York:  McGraw-Hil l ,  1979.  
Parker,  E.  Teaching pupils  the conscious use of a  technique of thinking.  
The Mathematics Teacher,  1924,  17,  191-201.  
Parker,  J .  C.  ,  Rubin,  L.  J .  Process as  content:  Curriculum design 
and the applicat ion of knowledge.  Chicago:  Rand McNally,  1966.  
Parsons,  C.  Inhelder  and Piaget 's  "The growth of logical  thinking":  II .  
A logician 's  viewpoint .  Bri t ish Journal  of Psychology,  I960,  51,  
371-379.  
Parsons,  T.  Structure and process in modern societ ies .  Glencoe,  111.  :  
The Free Press,  I960.  
Piaget ,  J .  Judgment and reasoning in the child.  New York:  Harcourt ,  
Brace,  & World,  1926.  (a)  
Piaget ,  J .  The language and thought  of the child.  London: Routledge 
& Kegan Paul ,  1926.  (b)  
Piaget ,  J .  The child 's  conception of the world.  New York:  Harcourt ,  
Brace,  & World,  1929.  
Piaget ,  J .  The moral  iudgment of  the child.  New York:  Harcourt ,  Brace,  
& World,  1932.  
Piaget ,  J .  The origins of intel l igence in children.  New York:  
Internat ional  Universi t ies  Press,  1952.  
Piaget ,  J .  Play,  dreams and imitat ion in childhood.  New York:  W. W. 
Norton,  1962.  
Piaget ,  J .  Development and learning.  In R.  E.  Ripple & V. N.  Rock­
cast le  (Eds.  ) ,  Piaget  rediscovered.  I thaca,  N.  Y. :  Cornell  
Universi ty,  1964.  
Piaget ,  J .  The child 's  concept  of  number.  New York:  W. W. Norton,  
1965.  
77 
Piaget,  J .  Six psychological studies.  New York: Random House, 1967. 
Piaget ,  J .  The child's conception of time.  New York: Ballantine,  1969. 
Piaget ,  J .  The child 's  conception of movement and speed.  New York:  
Ballantine,  1970.  (a)  
Piaget ,  J .  Piaget  theory. In P.  H. Mussen (Ed.) ,  Carmichael 's  manual  
of child pisychology (Vol.  1) .  New York:  Wiley,  1970.  (b)  
Piaget  J .  Science of education and the psychology of the child.  New 
York:  1970.  (c)  
Piaget ,  J .  Psychology and epistomology:  Towards a  theory of knowledge.  
New York:  Viking Press,  1971.  (a)  
Piaget ,  J .  Struct ionalism. New York:  Harper & Row, 1971.  (b)  
Piaget ,  J .  The child and real i ty:  Problems of genetic  epistomology.  
New York:  Grossman,  1972.  (a)  
Piaget ,  J .  Intel lectual  evolut ion from adolescence to adulthood.  Human 
Development,  1972,  15,  1-12.  (b)  
Piaget ,  J .  To understand is  to invent:  The future of education.  New York:  
Grossman,  1973.  
Piaget ,  J .  Piaget 's  theory.  In B.  Inhelder  & H. H. Chipman (Eds.  ) ,  
Piaget  and his  school .  Berl in:  Springer-Verlag,  1976.  
Piaget ,  J . ,  & Inhelder ,  B.  Mental  images.  In P.  Fraisse & J .  Piaget  
(Eds.) ,  Experimental  psychology:  I ts  scope and method (Vol.  7) .  
London: Routledge & Kegan Paul ,  1969.  (a)  
Piaget ,  J . ,  & Inhelder ,  B.  The psychology of the child.  New York:  
Basic Books,  1969.  (b)  
Piaget ,  J . ,  & Inhelder ,  B.  Memory and intel l igence.  New York:  Basic 
Books,  1973.  
Piaget ,  J . ,  & Inhelder ,  B.  The origin of the idea of.  chance in children.  
New York:  Norton,  1975.  
Piaget ,  J . ,  Inhelder ,  B.  ,  & Szeminska,  A.  The child 's  conception of 
geometry.  London: Routledge & Kegan Paul ,  I960.  
78 
Pinard,  A. ,  & Laurendeau,  M. "Stage" in Piaget 's  cognit ive-develop­
mental  theory:  Exegesis  of a  concept .  In D. Elkind & J .  H. Flavell  
(Eds.  ) ,  Studies in cognit ive development:  Essays in honor of Jean 
Piaget.  New York: Oxford University Press,  1969. 
Renner,  J .  W. ,  Stafford,  D.  G.  ,  Lawson,  A.  E.  ,  Mckinnon,  J .  W. ,  Friot ,  
F.  E„ ,  & Kellogg,  D.  H.  Research,  teaching and learning with 
the Piaget  model  Norman; Universi ty of  Oklahoma Press,  
1976.  
Rice,  F.  P.  Intel lectual  and cognit ive growth and change (chap.  19).  In 
The adolescent:  Development,  relat ionships,  and culture (2nd ed.  ) .  
Boston:  Allyn & Bacon,  1978.  
Riedesel ,  C.  A. Problem solving:  Some suggest ions from research.  
Ari thmetic Teacher,  1969,  16,  54-58.  
Rogers,  C. R. Freedom to learn. Columbus, Ohio: C. E. Merrill ,  1969. 
Rohwer,  W. D. Elaborat ion and learning in childhood and adolescence.  
In H.  W. Reese (Ed.  ) ,  Advances in child development and behavior  
(Vol.  8) .  New York:  Academic Press,  1973.  
Rosch,  E.  H. On the internal  s tructure of perceptual  and semantic 
categories.  In T.  E.  Moore (Ed.  ) ,  Cognit ive development and the 
acquisi t ion of language.  New York:  Academic,  1973.  
Rosch,  E.  H. Cognit ive representat ions of semantic categories.  Journal  
of experimental  Psychology,  1975,  104,  192-233.  
Rosskopf,  M. F.  ,  Steffe,  L>. P .  ,  & Taback,  S.  Piagetian cognit ive 
developmental  research and mathematical  education.  Washington,  
D.  C.  :  National  Council  of  Teachers of Mathematics,  1971.  
Scandura,  J .  M. Research in mathematics education:  An overview and a  
perspective.  In J .  M. Scandura (Ed.  ) ,  Research in mathematics 
education.  Washington,  D.  C.  :  National  Council  of  Teachers of 
Mathematics,  1967.  
Scandura,  J .  M. (Ed.  ).  Structural  learning:  I .  Theory and research.  
New York:  Gordon & Breach,  Science Publishers,  1973.  
Scandura,  J .  M. (Ed.  ).  Structural  Learning.  II  Issues and approaches.  
New York:  Gordon & Breach,  Science Publishers,  1976.  
79 
Scandura,  J .  M. Problem solving:  A structural /process approach with 
instruct ional  implicat ions.  New York:  Academic Press,  1977.  
Schell ,  R.  E.  ,  & Hall ,  E.  Developmental  psychology today (3rd ed.  ) .  
New York:  Random House,  1979.  
Schulman,  L.  S.  Psychology and mathematics education.  In E.  G.  Begle 
(Ed.  ) ,  Mathematics Education,  69th Yearbook of the National  Society 
for  the Study of Education.  Chicago:  Universi ty of Chicago Press,  
1970.  
Schwab,  J .  J .  The concept  of  the s tructure of a  discipl ine.  Educational  
Record,  1962,  43,  197-205.  
Schwebel ,  M. Formal operat ions in f i rs t-year  college students .  Journal  
of  Psychology,  197 5,  _91_,  133-141.  
Schwebel ,  M. ,  & Raph,  J .  (Eds.  ) .  Piaget  in the classroom. New York:  
Basic Books,  1973.  
Shavelson,  R.  J .  Some aspects  of the correspondence between content  
s tructure and cognit ive s tructure in physics instruct ion.  Journal  
of  Educational  Psychology,  1972,  63,  22 5-234.  
Shavelson,  R.  J .  ,  & Geesl in,  W. E.  A method for  examing subject-matter  
s tructure in instruct ional  material .  Journal  of  Structural  Learning,  
1973,  4,  100-109.  
Sheehy,  G.  Passages:  Predictable cr ises of adult  l i fe .  New York:  E.  P.  
Dutton,  1976.  
Si lberman,  C.  E.  Crisis  in the classroom: The remaking of American 
education.  New York:  Random House,  197 0.  
Simon,  H. A. ,  & Newell ,  A.  Human problem solving:  The state of the 
theory in 1970.  American Psychologist ,  1971,  26,  145-159.  
Stake,  R.  E.  ,  & Easley,  J .  A.  Case studies in science education.  
Washington,  D.  C.  :  National  Science Foundation,  1978.  
Steffe,  L.  P.  ,  & Parr ,  R.  B.  The development of concepts  of  rat io and 
fract ion in the fourth,  f i f th,  and sixth years  of the elementary 
school  (Tech.  Rep.  No.  49).  Madison:  Universi ty of  
Wisconsin,  1968.  
80 
Stevenson,  H.  W.,  Hale,  G.  A. ,  Klein,  R.  E.  ,  & Miller ,  L.  K.  
Interrelat ions and correlates in chi ldren 's  learning and problem 
solving.  Monographs of the Society for  Research in Child Develop-
ment,  1968,  3J5 (7,  Serial  No.  123).  
Suppes,  P.  The case for  information-oriented (basic)  research in 
mathematics education.  In J .  M. Scandura (Ed.  ) ,  Research in 
Mathematics Education.  Washington,  D.  C. :  National  Council  of  
of  Teachers of Mathematics,  1967.  
Suydam, M. N. Annotated compilat ion of research on secondary school  
mathematics,  1930-1970.  Washington,  D.  C.  :  U. S.  Department 
of Health,  Education,  and Welfare,  Project  No.  l -C-004,  1972.  
Tamburrini ,  J .  Piaget  in perspective:  Educational  implicat ions.  Paper 
presented at  the conference on Piaget  at  the Universi ty of Sussex,  
England,  Apri l  1968.  
Tomlinson-Keasey,  C.  Formal operat ions in females from eleven to 
fifty-four years of age. Developmental Psychology, 1972, 16, 
364.  
Ulmer,  G.  Teaching geometry to cult ivate reflect ive thinking:  An 
experimental  s tudy with 1,  129 high school  pupils .  Journal  of 
Experimental  Psychology,  1939,  8,  18-25.  
Vail lant ,  G.  E.  Adaptat ion to l i fe .  Boston:  Lit t le  & Brown, 1977.  
Vander Zanden,  J .  W. Human development.  New York:  Alfred A. 
Knopf,  1978.  
Vos,  K.  E.  The effects  of  three instruct ional  s trategies on problem-
solving behaviors in secondary school  matehmatics.  Journal  for  
Research in Mathematics Education,  1976,  1_,  264-275.  
Wason,  P.  C.  ,  & Johnson-Laird,  P.  M. The psychology of reasoning:  
Structure and content .  Cambridge,  Mass.  :  Harvard Universi ty 
Press,  1972.  
Webb,  R.  A.  Concrete and formal operat ions in very bright  6-  to 
11-year olds.  Human Development,  1974,  17,  292-300.  
Wilier ,  J .  The social  determination of knowledge.  Englewood Cliffs ,  
N.  J . :  Prentice-Hall ,  1971.  
81 
Witt  rock,  M. C.  The learning by discovery hypothesis .  Paper presented 
at  the Conference on Learning by Discovery,  New York,  January 
1965.  
Wohlvil le ,  J .  F.  The concept  of  experience:  S or  R? Human Development,  
1.973,  J_6,  90-107.  (a)  
Wohlvil le ,  J .  F.  The study of behavioral  development.  New York:  
Academic Press,  1973.  (b)  
82 
APPENDIX A 
DIRECTIONS AND LIST OF INTERVIEW QUESTIONS FOR COGNITIVE 
TASK ONE: NOTIONS OF CHANCE 
Cognit ive Task One replicates Inhelder  and Piaget 's  (1975,  ch.  1) 
experiment.  Marbles of two colors  (f ive black and f ive white)  are t i l ted 
back and forth inside a  rectangular  box.  Subjects  are to discuss the 
possible marble arrangements and their  understanding of related causes.  
Steps for  Marble Task 
1.  Calibrate t ipping apparatus.  
2.  Tell  subject  there are no wrong/right  answers*,  we're  just  
t rying to f ind out  how people differ  in their  perceptions of what  happens.  
3.  Make sure t ipping apparatus is  ready to go (with marbles 
arranged),  and blank apparatus and tape recorder have been tested.  
4.  Tell  subject ,  "I 've got  something here I  want  to talk to you 
about .  I  want  you to watch what  happens,  and later  on I ' l l  ta lk with you 
about  what  happens.  "  
5.  "Before we star t ,  I 'd  l ike you to show me how you think the 
marbles would look if  we t ipped i t  back and forth just  one t ime.  You can 
use these marbles (give to S) and place them in this  other  table (point  to 
blank apparatus) .  RECORD PREDICTION. 
6.  "Now watch what  happens when I  t ip i t  one t ime." TIP 
APPARATUS BACK AND FORTH. 
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7.  "Does your predict ion look l ike how these marbles came back?" 
OK, now watch while I  t ip i t  once more.  "  TIP APPARATUS A SECOND 
TIME. 
8.  "Before I  t ip i t  again,  use those other  marbles to show me 
how you think these wil l  look after  I  t ip i t  another  t ime.  "  RECORD 
PREDICTION, THEN TIP APPARATUS AGAIN. 
9.  "Do those look l ike these?" "OK, now watch while I  t ip 
i t  again.  "  TIP APPARATUS. 
10.  "OK, now you can use those other  marbles again to show me 
how they' l l  look after  I  t ip i t  one more t ime.  "  RECORD PREDICTION. 
THEN TIP APPARATUS. 
11.  "OK, now I 'm going to t ip i t  one last  t ime.  "  TIP APPARATUS 
AGAIN. 
12.  "Now I 'm going to talk with you a  l i t t le  about  what  you saw 
happening.  "  TURN ON TAPE RECORDER. 
Tape Recorded Interview 
Discuss the fol lowing i tems relat ive to the marble Task.  
1.  Do you think the marbles wil l  get  more or  less  mixed up if  
we added ten more marbles? What i f  we added a  hundred more? PROBE. 
2.  What would happen if  we continued t ipping i t  for  ten more 
t imes? A hundred more t imes? PROBE. 
3.  Do you think the marbles would ever come back to where they 
star ted,  with the blacks on their  s ide and the whites on their  s ide? PROBE. 
84 
4.  Will  they ever cross over to the other  s ide,  l ike they were 
swapping sides? If  we t ipped i t  long enough,  would they have to? PROBE. 
5.  What does mixing up mean anyway? How does mixing work? 
What controls  i t?  What happens to the marbles that  makes them get  
mixed up? 
6.  Could a  very smart  person ever guess exactly where the 
marbles would end up on each t ip,  you know, l ike a  mathematics professor? 
How would they do that? PROBE. 
7.  Are some arrangements more l ikely than others? What makes 
them (more l ikely/al l)  just  the same? PROBE. HAVE SUBJECT SHOW 
MOST LIKELY AND LEAST LIKELY ARRANGEMENTS, THEN PROBE 
FOR REASONS. 
8.  Does knowing how they' l l  turn out  in the long run have any 
relat ion to how they turn out  af ter  any single t ipping? 
9.  Note:  "What 's  your notion?" is  a  good quest ion to get  subject  
to talk.  Also:  "I 'm not  sure I  understand what  you mean.  "  
COGNITIVE TASK ONE: PREDICTION SHEET 
Marble Task 
Subject 's  id.  no:  
Name: 
Age:  
Date of Interview: 
Direct ions:  Draw circles when you think the f ive white marbles wil l  end 
up,  and draw circles with an X inside when you think the 
f ive black marbles wil l  end up.  
First  Predict ion:  
Second Predict ion:  
Third Predict ion:  
Draw the most  l ikely arrangement:  
Draw the least  l ikely arrangement:  
Comments:  
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APPENDIX B 
THREE TRANSCRIPTIONS OF EXEMPLAR INTERVIEWS: 
COGNITIVE TASK ONE, 
MARBLE TASK ON NOTIONS OF CHANCE 
Subject  #15 
DO YOU THINK THAT IF WE ADDED 10 MORE MARBLES TO THE BOX, 
THE ARRANGEMENT WOULD GET MORE OR LESS MIXED UP? 
I  think less  mixed up.  Because there 'd be less  chance of movement in 
there,  'cause there 'd be more in the space.  
WHAT DO YOU MEAN BY CHANCE? 
Well ,  the fewer objects  that  you have in a  space,  there 's  more room to 
move around and switch.  Whereas if  you've got  a  whole lot ,  they wouldn' t  
switch around as much,  'cause there wouldn' t  be as  much room to rol l .  
OK, HOW ABOUT IF WE ADDED A HUNDRED MORE MARBLES? DO 
YOU THINK THEY'D GET MORE OR LESS MIXED UP THEN? 
Less,  'cause i t 'd  be kind of hard for  them to move around.  
WHAT ABOUT IF WE ENLARGED THE SIZE OF THE BOX? 
If  you enlarged the s ize of the box,  then i t ' s  be about  the same,  the amount 
of  mixture.  I  don' t  think i t  would be real ly more or  less .  
OK, WHAT DO YOU THINK WOULD HAPPEN IF WE KEPT TIPPING 
THIS BOX, SAY TEN MORE TIMES? DO YOU THINK THAT THE MARBLES 
WOULD GET MORE OR LESS MIXED UP? 
The same number that 's  in there? 
YES, USING THE TEN MARBLES WE STARTED WITH. 
I  think they would become, um, less  mixed up.  I  think they would be more 
segregated as to which color  were on each side.  
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HOW COME? 
I  guess i ts  just  the way I  um, just  a  guess.  I ts  just  the law of averages 
would have i t  so i t  would even back out .  
WHAT DOES GUESSING HAVE TO DO WITH THIS? 
I  guess i t  just  has to do with the way I  think about  i t .  Because I  don' t  
know what  i ts  going to do.  
ARE YOU SAYING THE BEST WAY TO DO THIS WOULD BE TO JUST 
GUESS? 
For me i t  would,  'cause I  don' t  think mathematical ly or  in "n" dimensions 
or  stuff .  
YOU MENTIONED THE LAW OF AVERAGES. WHAT DO YOU MEAN BY 
THAT? 
Just  that  um, the way things seem to do.  The way they come out .  I  don' t  
know how to put  i t  into words.  
OK, WHAT IF WE TIPPED THIS BOX A HUNDRED MORE TIMES, DO 
YOU THINK IT WOULD BE MORE OR LESS MIXED UP? 
I  think i t  would be about  the same.  Like i t  would switch around,  but  by 
the end of a  hundred t imes,  i t1  d be about  the same as far  as  mix.  
COULD THE MARBLES EVER COME BACK JUST LIKE YOU PREDICTED 
OVER THERE? LIKE TO THEIR ORIGINAL SPOT? 
I  think they could,  but  I  don' t  know how many turns i t  would take.  
HOW ABOUT, DO YOU THINK THEY COULD EVER COMPLETELY 
CROSS OVER TO THE OTHER SIDE, WHERE THE WHITES WERE OVER 
HERE AND THE BLACKS OVER HERE? 
Yeah.  I  don' t  know why,  but  I  do.  
DO YOU THINK BOTH OF THOSE ARE POSSIBLE ARRANGEMENTS THEN? 
Umhum (yes) .  
COULD WE JUST TIP IT RIGHT NOW AND HAVE THAT HAPPEN? 
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I  have no idea.  I ts  a  chance,  but  I  have no idea.  
OK, WHAT DOES MIXING UP MEAN TO YOU? HOW WOULD YOU 
DESCRIBE MIXING UP? 
Mixing up would be to put  different  colors  together ,  different  numbers 
of the marbles together ,  not  necessari ly the same number on each side,  
but  different  colors .  
OK, HOW DOES THAT WORK? HOW DOES THAT OCCUR? 
By t ipping the box.  
IS THAT THE ONLY THING THAT AFFECTS IT? 
I  imagine the amount of  pressure that 's  put  on i t  when you t ip i t .  
OK, WHAT CONTROLS WHERE THEY LAND OR HOW THEY MIX? 
I  would think whether or  not  they hi t  up here and just  rol led part  way,  
with what  force and what  angle.  
COULD YOU EXPLAIN THAT A LITTLE FURTHER? 
I  don' t  know, let 's  see.  Um, I  think i t  would just  be when you t i l ted i t  
i f  they hi t  each other  or  when they hi t  the s ides,  and the angle at  which 
they hi t ,  and the force would determine where they would land.  
WELL, DO YOU THINK THAT SOMEBODY REALLY SMART, LIKE A 
MATHEMATICS PROFESSOR COULD JUST LOOK AT THIS AND MAKE 
A PREDICTION THAT WOULD BE RIGHT EACH TIME IT WAS TIPPED? 
Yeah,  I  think so.  I  think they could look at  um, just  because they've 
learned to think that  way or  they tend to think that  way,  l ike the dimensions 
and the number of marbles and how hard they hi t ,  and f igure up an average 
of how i t  would turn back or  whatever.  
SO THOSE ARE THINGS HE WOULD HAVE TO KNOW TO BE ABLE TO 
PREDICT? 
I  would think so,  or  ei ther  be a  good guesser  ( laughter) .  
DO YOU THINK THERE'S OTHER WAYS TO LOOK AT IT.  WHILE YOU 
GUESS, DO YOU BELIEVE THE MATHEMATICS PROFESSOR COULD WORK 
OUT A FORMULA FOR IT? 
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Yeah,  I  think there 's  ways to work out  things l ike that ,  but  I  think the 
average person on the s treet  guesses.  
OK, UM DO YOU THINK SOME ARRANGEMENTS ARE MORE LIKELY 
THAN OTHERS? 
Hmm, I  hadn' t  thought  about  i t .  If  you're  looking at  i t  mathematical ly,  
there probably are,  but  if  you look at  i t  the way I  look at  i t  well  .  .  .  
there aren ' t .  
SO YOU THINK ANY ARRANGEMENT IS LIKELY? 
Right .  
(Shows l ikely arrangement)  
(Show less  l ikely arrangement)  
OK, WHY DID YOU CHOOSE THAT? 
I  just  think that  unless you purposely manipulated i t  i t  would be hard for  
them al l  to be on one s ide.  
OK, THAT'S INTERESTING. TELL ME, DO YOU THINK THAT KNOWING 
HOW THINGS WOULD TURN OUT IN THE LONG RUN WOULD GIVE YOU 
ANY INDICATION OF WHAT MIGHT TURN UP ON A SINGLE TIP? 
You mean l ike if  we knew after  one hundred t imes that  i t  would end up 
this  way? 
RIGHT. 
Yeah,  I  think you'd be more accurate with i t .  
SO AFTER WATCHING IT ONE HUNDRED TIMES, WE'D KNOW WHAT 
THE 103 s t  TIP WOULD LOOK LIKE? 
Well ,  l ike two out  of  three t imes.  'Cause on one t ip i t  would just  be 
chance.  
THERE'S THAT WORD "CHANCE" AGAIN. CAN YOU TELL ME A LITTLE 
MORE ABOUT THAT? 
Well  i t  would just  be,  l ike you um can do one certain thing a  hundred t imes,  
and that  may be the result .  But  if  you do i t  a  hundred t imes again,  you 
may get  a  different  result .  
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SO WHAT WOULD CAUSE THE DIFFERENT RESULTS? 
Well ,  the l ine of the marbles,  how they were l ined up.  Like if  you 
s tar ted from a total ly different  s tar t ing point .  Do i t  would change i t  the 
next  hundred t imes,  or  "i t  might  not  change i t .  
Subject  #16 
WILL THEY GET MORE MIXED IF WE ADDED TEN? 
About the same.  
100? 
More mixed up;  they'd be more to run into.  That  doesn' t  agree with what  
I  said earl ier .  With more marbles there 'd be more act ion.  
IF WE TIPPED IT MORE TIMES? 
Yes,  the more you t ipped i t  the more i t 'd  get  confused.  I t 'd  have more 
chances,  but  whether i t 'd  do that .  
TIPPED IT 100 MORE TIMES? 
? 
WHAT CAUSES THEM TO GET MIXED UP? 
When you t i l t  the board,  and they hi t ,  if  they are not  level ,  if  . . .  .  
I  HAD CHECKED IT OUT BEFORE WE STARTED. WHAT HAPPENS TO 
THE MARBLES? 
They rol l  down and back.  They probably wouldn' t  come back to the same 
place.  Abnormali t ies  of the experiment-would cause them to go sideways.  
THE ONLY THING THAT CAUSES THEM TO GET MIXED UP IS ONCE 
THEY DEVIATE FROM THE STRAIGHT AND NARROW PATH, THEN 
OTHER THINGS START TO HAPPEN. 
I t  causes a  chain react ion.  
IF WE CONTINUED, WOULD THEY EVER COME BACK TO THE ORIGINAL 
POSITION? 
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Yes. 
HAVE TO? 
No. 
WHAT WOULD MAKE IT HAPPEN? 
Patience.  Eventually,  the probabil i ty of  the odds aren ' t  so far  off  that  
you couldn' t  do i t .  
WHAT DO PROBABILITY AND ODDS HAVE TO DO WITH THIS? 
I t ' s  probabil i ty not  level ,  l ike there 's  a  speck of dust .  Probabil i ty is  l ike 
the chips you can' t  tel l  what 's  going to happen.  I t  might  hi t  something you 
don' t  see.  
WHAT ABOUT SWITCHING SIDES? 
Yes,  i t1  d happen.  
MORE OR LESS LIKELY TO HAPPEN THAN RETURNING TO THE 
ORIGINAL POSITION? 
Less l ikely to switch s ides.  More l ikely to come back to the original  s ide 
if  the board were f lat .  I  don' t  know. They'd probably come out  equal .  
IF WE HAD THE MATH PROF, DO YOU THINK HE COULD BE ABLE TO 
PREDICT IT ACCURATELY EACH TIME? 
No. He knows lots  about  math,  but  not  about  the physical  propert ies  of 
the rol l .  They'd be lef t  up to chance.  He would be guessing if  he got i t  
r ight .  
SHOW ME .  .  .  (TAPE CUT OFF) 
Subject  #20 
CINDY, DO YOU THINK THE MARBLES WOULD GET MORE OR LESS 
MIXED UP IF WE ADDED TEN MORE MARBLES TO THE BOX? 
Less.  
HOW COME? 
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'Cause there 'd be more in there and they'd be al l  scrunched up together .  
SO DO YOU THINK THE MOVEMENT OF THE MARBLES HAS SOMETHING 
TO DO WITH HOW THEY END UP WHEN WE TIP IT? 
Yes.  
OK, COULD YOU EXPLAIN TO ME HOW THAT WORKS? 
If  there was more marbles,  then there wouldn' t  be as  much room for  them 
to move,  'cause the marbles would take up more space,  and they'd be more 
l ikely to s tay where they was at .  Maybe a  few of them would.  
OK WHAT DO YOU THINK WE'D GET IF WE ADDED A HUNDRED MORE 
MARBLES? 
Less mixed up,  'cause then they would ' t  hardly have anyplace to move.  
Just  kinda stay where they was at .  Just  move a  l i t t le  bi t .  
OK, HOW ABOUT IF WE STARTED BACK WITH OUR ORIGINAL BOX 
WITH TEN MARBLES AND WENT ON TO TIP IT TEN MORE TIMES, 
THEN DO YOU THINK THEY'D GET MORE OR LESS MIXED UP? 
More.  
HOW COME? 
'Cause they got  more chances to get  mixed up.  
I  SEE. WHAT DOES CHANCE HAVE TO DO WITH THIS? 
Well  if  you only do i t  two t imes,  then a  few of them wil l  move.  But if  you 
do i t  ten t imes,  then I  think more of 'em would move around.  
OK, WELL WHAT DO YOU THINK THIS NOTION OF CHANCE HAS TO 
DO WITH HOW THE MARBLES WILL LOOK IN THE END? 
Well ,  you real ly don' t  know how they're  gonna go.  I t  just  happens.  
I  SEE. IS THERE ANYTHINGS THAT CONTROLS IT? 
I  don' t  think so.  I  think they just  go.  
WELL, WHAT IF WE TIPPED IT A HUNDRED MORE TIMES? WOULD IT 
BE MORE OR LESS MIXED UP THEN? 
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Less.  
HOW COME? 
Because they can only mix up so many t imes.  
WHAT DO YOU MEAN? 
Have so many whites over here and so many blacks over here,  and um, 
so many on top of the other  ones.  
WHAT DOES MIXING MEAN, ANYWAY? 
They're not  l ike in a  s traight  l ine,  and they're  not  l ike the same color  
al l  together .  Just  mixed up.  
DO YOU THINK IT WOULD BE POSSIBLE FOR THEM TO CHANGE SIDES 
FROM HOW THEY STARTED OUT? COULD THE BLACK MARBLES ALL 
END UP OVER HERE AND THE WHITE MARBLES END UP OVER HERE? 
Yeah,  i ts  possible,  but  not  l ikely.  
NOT LIKELY. WHAT MAKES SOMETHING LIKELY? 
I  guess according to what 's  happened to i t  before.  
OK, UM, DO YOU MEAN THAT YOU THINK THERE IS A PATTERN TO 
THE WAY THESE MARBLES FALL? 
No, i t  just ,  um, there sorta was a  pat tern,  but  there sorta wasn' t .  Like 
there wasn' t  a  whole lot  of  whites over here and a  whole lot  of  whites 
over here.  
OK, UM, DO YOU THINK THE MARBLES WOULD EVER COME BACK 
LIKE THEY STARTED OUT, WITH WHITES OVER HERE AND BLACKS 
HERE? 
Eventually,  af ter  a  while.  You know, af ter  you just  kept  on doing i t .  
WOULD IT BE LIKELY? 
No. 
DO YOU THINK A REALLY SMART PERSON, LIKE A MATHEMATICS 
PROFESSOR, WOULD HE BE ABLE TO PREDICT HOW EACH TIP WOULD 
COME OUT? 
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Yes. 
OK, HOW WOULD HE DO IT? WHAT KINDS OF THINGS WOULD HE 
HAVE TO KNOW? 
He'd have to include probabil i ty.  
OK, WHAT DO YOU MEAN BY PROBABILITY? 
Like how many t imes,  u.  First  I  think he would just  experiment and 
look at  how they went.  And then decide by how many t imes he did i t  
what  the chances were that  i t  would come out  one way or  the other .  
HOW WOULD HE FIGURE OUT THESE CHANCES AND PROBABILITY? 
Well ,  you have f ive of each color .  And if  you,  say,  do i t  f i f teen t imes,  
you f igure out  what  the,  how many t imes the blacks would be l ike have a  
chance to mix up with the white,  you know, for  the f i rs t  one.  And l ike 
that .  
DO YOU THINK IF HE DID THIS FOR A LONG TIME, AND FOUND OUT 
WHAT WOULD HAPPEN IN THE LONG RUN, THAT THAT WOULD HA'vE 
ANY RELATION TO THE VERY NEXT TIP? 
Say that  one more t ime.  
OK, IF HE DID THIS FOR A LONG PERIOD OF TIME, WOULD THAT 
HAVE ANY RELATION TO HOW THESE MARBLES WOULD TURN OUT 
AFTER ONE TIP? 
If  he did i t  a  whole lot  and kept  watching i t .  
THEN YOU THINK KNOWING THIS IN THE LONG RUN WOULD TELL YOU 
WHAT THE NEXT TIP WAS GOING TO BE? 
Close to i t ,  maybe.  
I  SEE. WELL, DO YOU THINK THAT SOME ARRANGEMENTS ARE 
MORE LIKELY THAN OTHER ARRANGEMENTS TO OCCUR? 
Yes.  
(Shows l ikely and unlikely arrangements)  
OK, WHAT MAKES THAT UNLIKELY? 
Well ,  when you s tar t  out ,  with the blacks and whites on their  own sid 
and when you t ip i t ,  i ts  just  not  l ikely that  the black ones are gonna 
gi t  r ight  between the white ones l ike that .  
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APPENDIX C 
DIRECTIONS AND LIST OF INTERVIEW QUESTIONS FOR 
COGNITIVE TASK TWO: NOTIONS OF PROBABILITY 
Cognit ive Task Two replicates Inhelder  and Piaget 's  (197 5,  ch.  5)  
experiment.  Poker chips of four colors  (9 yel low, 6 red,  2 white,  1  blue)  
al l  arranged as shown below. Subjects  are to discuss the possible drawings 
of pairs  of chips and their  understanding of how i t  changes in subsequent  
drawings.  
Poker Chip Task Direct ions 
Poker Chip Task 
Set  up chips l ike this:  YYYYYYYYY (9) 
RRRRRR (6) 
WW (2) 
B (1)  
MAKE SURE RECORDER IS RECORDING PROPERLY. 
Tell  subjects:  "This  is  kind of a  game. I ' l l  take the top chip off  
of  every stack here and put  i t  into this  paper bag (do this) .  Now would you 
mix those up real ly well  for  me (have S shake bag).  Now I want  you to 
draw out  two chips at  a  t ime without  looking,  but  before you do,  tel l  me 
which color  you think each chip is  most  l ikely to be.  "  
Tape Recorded Interview 
RECORD FIRST PREDICTION: Ask:  Why did you choose that  color/ those 
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colors? What makes i t / them the more likely ? Are' the re any other possible 
pairs that  would be more l ikely? Are there any other possible pairs that  
are unlikely? Which ones? How come? What makes something the most/  
least  l ikely anyway? PROBE. Allow subject  to draw two chips and record 
drawing. 
RECORD SECOND AND THIRD PREDICTIONS AND DRAWINGS. 
On Trial  #4 -  repeat above questions after subject 's  prediction.  Also ask,  
What makes predictions work? 
RECORD FIFTH AND SIXTH PREDICTIONS AND DRAWINGS. 
On Trial  #7 -  ask all  of the above questions.  In addit ion,  ask: How 
many chips of each color are left  in the bag? How could you tel l? 
Would a very smart  person be able to predict  which colors he'd get  each 
t ime? How come? What would that  person need to know, how .  .  .  
What determines which color(s)  get  drawn each t ime? How does that  work? 
What 's  the best  way to f igure out which colors are most l ikely to get  drawn? 
Does knowing what you' l l  get  in the long run have any affect  on what you 
draw for a single turn? 
RECORD EIGHT AND NINTH PREDICTIONS AND DRAWINGS. 
QUESTION AT END: (1) When we first  begin are we more likely to get  
YY or YR? How would you figure out whether one pair  was more l ikely 
than another pair  of colors? (2) Does i t  make any difference drawing 
chips out one at  a  t ime rather than two at  a t ime? 
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COGNITIVE TASK TWO: PREDICTION SHEET 
Random Drawing of Chips Task 
Subject 's  id.  no.  :  
Name: 
Age: 
Date of Interview: 
Directions:  Record predictions of pair  of chips (l ike YY, RY, .  .  .  ) 
in f irst  column and the actual  draw in the second column. 
After interview, fi l l  in BD (best  draw) prediction available 
from actual chips remaining, for scoring purposes.  
T rials Predicts Draws BD 
1* 
2 
3 
4* 
5 
6 
7* 
8 
Comments 
*Tape record discussion points.  
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APPENDIX D 
THREE TRANSCRIPTIONS OF EXEMPLAR INTERVIEWS: 
COGNITIVE TASK TWO, POKER CHIPS TASK ON 
NOTIONS OF PROBABILITY 
Subject  #15 
WHAT COLORS OR WHAT COMBINATION OF COLORS IS MDST LIKELY 
FOR YOU TO DRAW OUT? 
Ok, um, yellow and red.  
OK, WHY DID YOU CHOOSE THAT? 
Because they're my two favorite colors.  
OK (laughs),  DOES THAT MAKE THEM THE MOST LIKELY? 
No. 
OK, WHAT DOES MAKE SOMETHING MOST LIKELY? 
Well ,  there are more of the yellow ones and there are more of the red 
ones,  and so that  would make a difference.  
WELL, THERE ARE ACTUALLY MORE YELLOW ONES THAN THERE 
ARE RED. HOW COME YOU DIDN'T CHOOSE TWO YELLOW ONES ? 
I  guess 'cause I  don' t  usually tend to pick two of the same thing. I  usually 
pick something different.  
Red and Blue.  
HOW COME? 
Well  the odds are going down on the yellow, 'cause I  picked three of those.  
The odds are going down on the red and the white.  
WHAT DO YOU MEAN BY ODDS? 
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There's  three of these eliminated now; there 's  two of these eliminated 
now. So that  only makes this many more,  and that  many more (manip­
ulating chips) and one of these.  And this one (blue) is  start ing to get  
down to where I  could possibly pick up a blue one.  
ARE THERE ANY OTHER PAIRS THAT WOULD BE JUST AS LIKELY? 
Oh yeah, I  could get  two reds,  two yellows, the white and the blue,  the 
red and the blue,  the yellow and the blue.  
OK, SO YOU THINK THE RED AND BLUE IS THE MOST LIKELY PAIR? 
Yeah, I  don' t  know why, just  a  hunch. 
HOW DO HUNCHES PLAY INTO THIS? 
Hunches play in with anything I  look at .  ( laughter)  
WELL THIS IS KIND OF LIKE PLAYING CARDS OR SLOT MACHINES. 
I  usually lose at  cards;  my hunches aren' t  really all  that  great .  
OK, YOU MENTIONED IN YOUR SECOND DRAW THAT THE PROBABILITY 
OF SOMETHING. WHAT DID YOU MEAN BY THAT? 
I  don't  remember my statement.  
IT WASN'T RECORDED, BUT YOU MENTIONED IT WHEN YOU MADE 
YOUR SECOND DRAW. 
Oh, I  think i t  works with the number of objects you're working with of 
each individual color.  You're going to have more in there of one color 
than another color to pick out.  I t  might not work out though, cause you 
could get  those on the f irst  t ime. Or it  could be that  there are more of 
those colors,  so you pick those.  
Red and yellow. 
OK, WHY DID YOU CHOOSE THAT ? 
I  have more of those left  than I  do the white one.  
WHAT MAKES THEM THE MOST LIKELY? 
There 's  more of them in there.  
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OK, ARE ANY OTHER COMBINATIONS JUST AS LIKELY? 
Well ,  i t  could be red and white,  i t  could be red and red,  i t  could be red 
and yellow, i t  could be yellow and yellow, i t  could be yellow and white.  
OK, HOW MANY CHIPS ARE LEFT IN THE BAG OF EACH COLOR? 
Uh, two yellows, three reds,  and one white.  
HOW COULD YOU TELL? 
I already counted them. 
OK, WOULD A REALLY SMART PERSON, LIKE OUR MATHEMATICS 
PROFESSOR WE WERE TALKING ABOUT A WHILE AGO, BE ABLE TO 
PREDICT WHICH COLORS HE'D GET ON EACH DRAW? 
I don' t  think so.  
HOW COME? 
'Cause he wouldn' t  know how they fell  into the bag when you put 'em in.  
Each person, um shakes the bag differently,  and there 'd be just  so many 
factors in there that  I  don' t  think they could determine i t .  
I  SEE. WELL WHAT DETERMINES WHICH COLORS GET DRAWN 
ANYWAY? 
The person putt ing their  hand in and picking i t  out,  or  the availabil i ty of 
the colors.  Like they're not going to pick a black one if  there aren' t  any 
black ones in there.  
THAT'S INTERESTING. LET'S SEE. IF YOU WERE TRYING TO EXPLAIN 
TO SOMEBODY ELSE, HOW WOULD YOU EXPLAIN TO THEM THE BEST 
WAY TO FIGURE OUT WHAT IS MOST LIKELY TO GET DRAWN? 
I wouldn' t  be able to tel l ,  because I  really don't  know. 
OK, WELL, WHAT DID YOU DO TO FIGURE THIS OUT? 
Well  part  of the t ime I  look at  how many are left  of each color,  and I  
usually go with at  least  one of the colors that  has more in there.  And 
the other one is  just  that  I  l ike variety.  You know, i ts  l ike,  i ts  just  a  
personal thing,  i ts  not anything really scientif ic.  
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OK, DOES KNOWING WHAT YOU'LL GET IN THE LONG RUN HAVE ANY 
AFFECT ON WHAT YOU'LL GET ON A SINGLE DRAWING? 
If you use the same exact colors in the same numbers,  and you had a 
control  group type study, you could come up with a pretty sure answer 
if  they all  came up with the same last  two colors left .  But on the draws 
before the last  one there 'd be no way to control  i t  for sure which order 
they got drawn out in.  
Subject  #16 
First  prediction would be red and yellow since there are more than blue 
and white.  
OTHER PAIRS JUST AS LIKELY? 
Oh, yes,  any combination of the four.  
JUST AS LIKELY? 
Yes.  You could just  as probably get  one as another.  
HOW DOES PROBABILITY WORK? 
Like a ratio:  9 to 6 to 2 to 1.  I 'd get  a yellow 9 t imes more than I 'd get  
a  blue.  
IF YOU HAVE MORE ODDS OF GETTING A YELLOW ONE THAN A RED 
ONE, HOW DOES THAT RELATE TO YOUR PREDICTION OF GETTING A 
RED AND A YELLOW. 
There 's  more yellow and red than blue and white.  
FOURTH PREDICTION? 
Three yellows, red,  white and a blue out of the bag now. Nine minus three 
equals six yellows left .  Five reds left  and one white and a blue.  Chances 
are almost even for a yellow and a red.  
OTHER COMBINATIONS JUST AS LIKELY? 
Yes.  White and red or yellow and white,  but not just  as l ikely.  
WHAT CAUSES A DIFFERENT LIKELIHOOD? 
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Because of the number of chips left  in the bag makes me think that  I ' l l  
pick one of those f irst .  
Two yellows, three reds and one white left ,  therefore,  more chances for 
a red.  One chance in six to get  a  white.  I ' l l  s t i l l  have to go with red and 
yellow. 
IF A PERSON WANTS TO GO BY NUMBER, THEN THIS IS A GOOD WAY 
TO MAKE A PREDICTION? IS THAT THE BEST WAY TO FIGURE OUT 
THE MOST LIKELY? 
Yes,  basing i t  on the number of chips left  in the bag. 
IS THERE A RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN WHAT'S THE MOST LIKELY TO 
GET PICKED AND WHAT YOU MIGHT ACTUALLY GET? 
Chance determines i t .  You never know what i t  is  going to be.  
CHANCE? 
Any of the chips could come out of the bag. You couldn' t  tel l  what would 
come out.  There is  an equal chance for each chip to come out,  any color 
at  any t ime. 
IS THERE AN EQUAL CHANCE FOR EACH COLOR? 
Yes.  
EARLIER YOU TOLE ME THAT RED AND YELLOW HAD A BETTER 
CHANCE: NOW YOU ARE TELLING ME THAT ALL HAVE AN EQUAL 
CHANCE? 
When we started there were more red and yellow, there are more chances 
for them. Odds would be the way that  things stack up. Since there are 
more yellow chips in there,  I  think the odds are better.  I  don' t  know why 
I 'd pick yellow over blue if  both are in there,  but I  would because there 's  
more yellows in there.  
WOULD A SMART MATH PROF WHO KNEW ALL ABOUT PROBABILITY, 
WOULD HE BE ABLE TO GET EVERY PREDICTION RIGHT? 
Probably not.  
LOT OF LUCK INVOLVED? 
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Right. 
WHY COULDN'T HE GET THEM RIGHT WITH ALL OF HIS MATH 
KNOWLEDGE? 
Fate,  chance,  luck,  destiny--I  don't  know. No one could know exactly 
what you are going to pull  out.  
DOES IT HELP ON A SINGLE DRAW IF YOU KNOW HOW THINGS WILL 
TURN OUT IN THE LONG RUN? 
Yeah, depending on what 's  left  in the bag. 
WHAT DETERMINES WHICH COLORS ACTUALLY GET DRAWN? 
I  just  get  the f irst  two I  touch. 
THE COLORS? 
I 'm not sure those are under control .  
WHEN WE FIRST BEGAN, WHERE WE MORE LIKELY TO GET TWO 
YELLOWS OR A RED AND YELLOW ON THE FIRST DRAW? 
Yellow and a red because you have more three more yellows than red.  
WHY WOULDN'T IT BE TWO YELLOWS. 
I  put them in a one to one correspondence,  and there are three left  over 
of the yellows. There are no more reds to correspond. 
SO YOU HAVE A BETTER CHANCE OF GETTING A SECOND CHIP OF 
RED THAN YELLOW? 
No. I t 's  how you think about i t .  If  you l ine them up equally,  and you 
draw--I 'd take yellow-yellow now. 
HOW WOULD YOU FIGURE OUT IF ONE PAIR OF COLORS WAS MORE 
LIKELY THAN ANOTHER? 
By the number left  in the bag. 
DOES IT MAKE ANY DIFFERENCE IN DRAWING CHIPS TWO OR ONE 
AT A TIME? 
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Yes, you'd have more combinations in two at  a t ime. Part  of me says 
you'd have an equal chance in drawing out one at  a  t ime, and the other 
part  of me says no. 
DIFFERENCE? 
Only single colors in the one draw, one of four chances.  I t 's  more 
complex with two. 
Subject  #20 
Two yellow ones.  
OK, HOW COME? 
Because there 's  more yellow ones,  and the chances of picking i t  out are 
better than the other ones.  
AND WHAT DO YOU MEAN BY CHANCE HERE? 
Well ,  if  you've got nine yellow ones,  and six red ones. ,  two white ones,  
and one blue one,  and you st ick your hand in the bag, there 's  more yellow 
ones.  And even thought they're mixed up, you'd probably draw one.  
WOULD ANY OTHERS BE JUST AS LIKELY? 
The red ones might,  but you've st i l l  got more yellows. 
OK, TELL ME WHICH COLOR YOU THINK EACH CHIP IS MOST LIKELY 
TO BE THIS TIME? 
Red and yellow. 
HOW COME? 
They're gett ing down pretty even. 
YES. 
I  st i l l  have more red and yellows than I  do white,  and st i l l  one more 
yellow than red,  but they're pretty close.  
WHAT MAKES THEM THE MOST LIKELY? 
There 's  more of them. 
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Red and white.  
OK, HOW COME? 
Tired of the yellow and the red.  
IS THAT WHAT MAKES IT MOST LIKELY? 
No. There 's  only one white left ,  and two yellows, three reds.  The 
chances would be better probably with the red and yellow than red and 
white.  
WHY DO YOU SAY THE CHANCES ARE BETTER? 
'Cause there 's  two yellows and only one white.  
OK, THEN WHICH IS MORE LIKELY, YOUR GUESS OF RED AND WHITE 
OR A GUESS OF RED AND YELLOW? 
Well ,  red and yellow are more likely,  but I  st i l l  want red and white.  
BUT WHAT WE'RE AFTER HERE IS THE COLORS THAT ARE MOST 
LIKELY. 
Ok, I ' l l  change i t  then.  Red and yellow. 
OK. WELL, WOULD A REALLY SMART PERSON BE ABLE TO PREDICT 
WHICH COLORS HE'D GET EACH TIME? 
Maybe not each t ime, but sort  of have an idea.  
HOW WOUttD HE GET THAT IDEA? 
According to how many colors of each chips he has.  
HOW DOES CHANCE WORK IN A CASE LIKE THIS? 
Well ,  unless there 's  just  a  few of them. Well ,  l ike with blue and white,  
there 'd be three.  There 'd be fif teen with the yellow and the reds.  So 
those three are gonna get ,  l ike lost  with the yellow and reds,  'cause 
there 's  so many of them. 
WHAT DETERMINES WHAT COLOR GETS DRAWN EACH TIME. 
The number that 's  in the bag of each color.  
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OK, COULD YOU EXPLAIN THAT A LITTLE FURTHER? 
Well ,  s ince there 's  nine yellows and six whites (sic),  and you st ick your 
hand in the bag. You don't  have to draw what 's  on top,  you can just  grab 
around in there and pick anything. And since there 's  more yellow ones than 
the others,  l ike there 'd be a yellow, maybe not two yellows on one draw, 
but there 'd be l ike one yellow in there on the f irst  t ime. You can just  use 
probabili ty.  
I  SEE. WELL WHAT DO YOU MEAN BY PROBABILITY? 
Like you see how many yellows, and how many reds,  and how many blue,  
and the whites.  And then you can look and see which is  most l ikely to 
get .  
OK, WELL WHAT ABOUT THIS? HOW WOULD YOU EXPLAIN IT IF YOU 
DIDN'T DRAW A YELLOW THE FIRST TIME, EVEN THOUGH THERE'S 
MORE YELLOWS IN THERE? 
The yellow ones were hid over the other ones (laughter) .  
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APPENDIX E 
COGNITIVE INTERVIEW ITEMS AND SCORING INSTRUCTIONS 
Operational Scoring Definit ions 
1.  Concrete Operational Stage Achievement:  Subjects passing 
none or one of the formal i tems. 
2.  Transit ional Operational Stage Achievement:  Subjects 
passing two or three of the five formal i tems. 
3.  Formal Operational Stage Achievement:  Subjects passing 
four or five of the formal i tems. 
Concrete Operational I tems 
CI.  Task 1:  Does the subject  logically explain either:  (a) that  
more tippings will  increase the mixture,  or (b) that  after  some init ial  
t ippings all  result ing arrangements are equally mixed? 
C2. Task 1:  Does the subject  affirm the possibil i ty of the marbles 
returning to their  init ial  distr ibution or the possibil i ty of crisscrossing 
sides without invoking tautological  arguments or the influence _>f external 
agents which act  differentially on the various marbles? 
C3. Task 1:  Do explanations of smart  person's inabil i ty to correctly 
predict  marble arrangements make reference to indeterminacy of the 
outcomes ? 
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C4. Task 2: Do explanations of a  smart  person's inabil i ty to 
correctly predict  pairwise drawings make reference to indeterminacy 
of the outcomes? 
C5. Task 2: Are frequency or quanti tat ive cri teria used to 
logically justify mo re than one prediction? 
C6. Task 2: Are three or more predictions the most probable? 
Formal Operational I tems 
Fl .  Task 1:  In explaining the relationship between mixture and 
more marbles/t ippings,  does the subject  ei ther:  (a) discuss more permu­
tations or more actual coll isions,  or (b) discuss relative equali ty of 
"mixed up" among permutations which deviate from the init ial  order? 
F2. Task 1:  Does the subject  explain a smart  person's inabil i ty 
to correctly predict  marble arrangements by appealing to the origin of 
indete rminacy ? 
F3.  Task 2: Does the subject  explain a smart  person's inabil i ty 
to correctly predict  pairwise drawings of chips by appealing to the origin 
of indeterminacy o_r the probabil i ty/odds of undrawn colors? 
F4. Task 2: Does the subject 's  explanation of the most l ikely 
corrbination of chips refer to a fraction or ratio of the total  chips undrawn? 
F5. Task 2: Are seven or more of the subject 's  predictions the 
most probable? 
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General  Scoring Instructions 
1.  There are 11 i tems in the interview battery.  The first  set  of 
s ix i tems dist inguishes concrete operations;  the second set  of f ive i tems 
dist inguishes formal operations.  There are no scorable i tems which 
could discriminate levels of abil i ty below concrete operations;  this is  
not meant to preclude the possibil i ty.  
2.  Each i tem is consti tuted by subject  response to an init ial  
probe question and answers to subsequent related probes.  Decisions 
about the relatedness of probes,  and hence about the inclusion or exclusion 
of any single response under an i tem must be left  to the discretion of each 
judge in relation to these scoring procedures.  Follow-up probe questions 
may vary sl ightly in content and wording. 
3.  In scoring each of the i tems, the judge must decide if  subject  
responses display the logical  character of at  least  the respective level 
of cognitive achievement.  I tems are scored "1" (passj)or "0" (fail) .  
4.  Judges are advised to consider each subject  on the basis of 
the optimum conceptual performance on a given task.  In a  case where 
data appears to be in conflict  or  marginally ambiguous,  the higher level 
response will  generally be scored.  
5.  Every effort  should be made to score i tems either pass or 
fail .  Occasionally data may be ambiguous or missing.  In such cases,  
if  the judge cannot score the i tem as either pass or fail ,  then i t  is  to be 
scored "X" (indeterminate).  
6.  After i tems have been scored independently,  judges should 
meet to resolve their  scoring disagreements through discussion.  In the 
event that  two judges cannot agree after discussing the responses to an 
i tem, the higher score is  to be assigned. Ranking scores from highest  
to lowest goes from pass to fail  to indeterminate.  For final  indeter­
minate scores,  al ternately substi tute a pass and fail  so the subject  can 
be categorized.  The number of scoring agreements between judges 
prior to making any resolutions about their  disagreements provides 
the basis for computation of rel iabil i t ies.  
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APPENDIX F 
MATHEMATICAL PROBLEM SOLVING INVENTORY 
The following six mathematical  problems were selected from 
those in the Mathematical  Representations of Cognitive Structures 
Inventory (Clark & Reeves,  in press).  The solutions to the problems 
represent cognitive structures (mathematical  concepts) used in problem 
solving. Each of the six problems tests for a specific mathematical  
concept and, synonymously,  for representations of a  specific mathe­
matical  cognitive structure.  The concepts or structures can be 
categorized into the two broad mathematical  areas of algebra and 
geometry; three problems were selected from each area,  as described 
in the table below. 
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TESTS FOR MATHEMATICAL CONCEPTS 
(REPRESENTATIONS OF MATHEMATICAL STRUCTURES) 
Problem Number 
Three Five Six 
Algebra 
1.  1 
Correspondence 
Proportion,  
Mixture 
Spatial  
Logic 
Geometry 
One 
Volume 
Measure 
Two 
A rea 
Measure 
F our 
Parti t ioning by-
intersecting 
Lines 
Directions 
Completion of the Mathematical  Representations of Cognitive 
Structures Inventory requires 36 minutes.  Each problem is allotted 
five minutes for solving. One minute is  allotted for completing the 
second page of each problem. Therefore,  each problem requires six 
minutes.  A total  of 36 minutes is  required for all  six problems. 
All  work is  to be done on the respective test  page.  Subjects are 
to work only on the page as directed without turning pages.  
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Problem 1 
Try to solve the following problem. Below the problem there is  
space for you to make any necessary drawings and to show your work.  
Do not go to the next page unti l  you are instructed to do so.  
O/  ̂ \l< sU sU O/ O/ 
A dozen balls  are tightly packed in a box of 3 rows, 
4 balls  in each row. If  each ball  has a radius of 
2 inches,  what are the inside dimensions of the box? 
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Problem 1--Page 2 
Instructions:  The four i tems shown below (A, B, C ,  .D) are 
related to the problem you have just  tr ied to solve.  One or more of 
these i tems may remind you of your understanding of the problem. 
Put a "1" beside the let ter  for the i tem which you think best  f i ts  the 
way you thought about the problem in order to solve i t .  Put a "2" 
beside the i tem which would be Next Best .  Put "3" and "4" beside the 
i tems of your next two choices.  "0" for any not f i t t ing.  
A  
B 
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Problem 1--Page 3 
H = 3 x 2 
L = 2 + 2 
W = 2 + 2 
D The height of the box is  the same as the sum 
of three diameters.  So the height of the box 
is  six inches.  The base of the box is  square 
and i ts  sides have length 
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Problem 2 
Try to solve the following problem. Below the problem there is  
space for you to make any necessary drawings and to show your work.  
Do not go to the next page unti l  you are instructed to do so.  
>!< ' Is  ' i '  ' I '  #^  ̂ V 'i '  >! '  
A  rectangular f loor is  to be constructed of square t i les,  
al l  the same size.  The dimension of the floor is  15 1/2 
feet  long and 8 1/3 feet  wide.  If  the f loor is  to be made 
only of whole pieces of t i le,  f ind a size of t i le which will  
work.  How many of your t i les would be needed to cover 
the f loor? 
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Problem 2--Page 2 
Instructions:  The four i tems shown below (A, B, C, D) are 
related to the problem you have just  tr ied to solve.  One or more of 
these i tems may remind you of your understanding of the problem. Put 
a "1" beside the let ter  for the i tem which you think best  f i ts  the way you 
thought about the problem in order to solve i t .  Put a "2" beside the 
i tems of your next two choices.  "0" for any not f i t t ing.  
A Each t i le is  to be a square so I  need to find the 
area of the floor and try to subdivide i t  into a 
whole number of l i t t le squares.  There is  more than 
one solution to the problem and one of these solutions 
may be found by first  finding a common denominator 
B Area = 15 1/2 x 8 1/3 
= 31/2 x 25/3 
= 93/6 x 50/6 
= 93 x 50 x (1/6)2  
= 4650 x (1/6)2 ;  So,  
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Problem 2--Page 3 
8 1/3 
15 1/2 
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Problem 3 
Try to solve the following problem. Below the problem there is  
space for you to make any necessary drawings and to show your work.  
Do not go to the next page unti l  you are instructed to do so.  
>!< s|s >|< s|< s\i >|c 
Thirty-two teams are to play in a single-elimination 
basketball  tournament--single-elimination means if  
a  team loses any game, they are no longer in the 
tournament.  How many games must be played in 
order for a winner to be declared? 
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Problem 3--Page 2 
Instructions:  The four i tems shown below (A, B, C, D) are 
related to the problem you have just  tr ied to solve.  One or more of 
these i tems may remind you of your understanding of the problem. Put 
a "1" beside the let ter  for the i tem which you think best  f i ts  the way you 
thought about the problem in order to solve i t .  Put a "2" beside the 
i tem which would be Next Best .  Put "3" and "4" beside the i tems of 
your next two choices.  "0" for any not f i t t ing.  
Number of teams Number of games 
A 2 
3 
4 
1 
2 
3 
32 
50 G = 
B 
Team 1 
Team 2 
Tearn 3 
Team 4 
Winner 1 
Winner 2 
Team 31 
Team 32 
Winner 16 
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Problem 3--Page 3 
1st Round 2nd Round 3rd Round 
16 games 8 games 4 games 
D Every t ime a game is played a team is eliminated 
from the tournament.  Since there are 32 teams in 
the tournament,  31 teams must lose,  so the number 
of games needed is  
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Problem. 4 
Try to solve the following problem. Below the problem there is  
space for you to make any necessary drawings and to show your work.  
Do not go to the next page unti l  you are instructed to do so.  
>:< >|< >|< sjc >|t ;|c ;!< i|< >|e >|< 
Suppose you are going to sl ice a pie with 6 
straight cuts of a  knife.  What is  the largest  
number of pieces you can get by doing this--
and don't  worry if  some of the pieces are 
smaller than others! 
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Problem 4--Page 2 
Instructions: The four i tems shown below (A, B, C, D) are 
related to the problem you have just tried to solve. One or more of 
these items may remind you of your understanding of the problem. 
Put a "1" beside the letter for the item which you think best fi ts the 
way you thought about the problem in order to solve i t .  Put a "3" 
and a "4" beside the i tems of your next two choices. "O1 1  for any not 
fit t ing. 
pieces on each cut i t  is  necessary to cross all  
previous cuts.  Furthermore, the cuts must not 
cross at the intersection of two previous cuts.  
Each time a cut crosses a previous cut there is 
an increase of one more piece 
A 
• • • 
B In order to get the greatest possible number of 
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Problem 4--Page 3 
C 
Number of cuts Number of pieces 
1 2 
2 4 
3 7 
4 11 
5 ? 
6 ? 
Number of pieces P = 
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Problem 5 
Try to solve the following problem. Below the problem there is 
space for you to make any necessary drawings and to show your work. 
>;< >;< >;< >;< >;< >;« >;< >;< ;;< >;< ;|< >;« >\t >;< % >;< 
Suppose you have 3 cups and 10 coins. Arrange them 
in such a way as to have an odd number of coins in 
each cup. Use all  10 coins in the arrangement.  Your 
task is to explain or show how this can be done. 
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Problem 5--Page 2 
Instructions: The four i tems shown below (A, B, C, D) are 
related to the problem you have just tried to solve. One or more of 
these items may remind you of your understanding of the problem. Put 
"1" beside the letter for the i tem which you think best fits the way you 
thought about the problem in order to solve it .  Put "2" beside the item 
which you think fits NEXT BEST. Put "3" and "4" beside the item of 
your next two choices. "0" if none seems to fit .  
A  
1 + 3 + 6  =  1 0  
B 3 + 5 + 2 = 10 
1 + 1 + 8  =  1 0  
1 + 7 + 2  =  1 0  
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Problem 5--Page 3 
C There are several things that might be "arranged" in 
this problem: The coins and the cups. Since the sum 
of any three odd numbers is always an odd number 
(i .  e . ,  not 10),  I  need to arrange the cups as well as 
the coins. So, by placing 
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Problem 6 
Try to solve the following problem. Below the problem there 
is space for you to make any necessary drawings and to show your work. 
Do not go to the next page until  you are instructed to do so. 
:!< >\t >:< >|< >\a >:< >|< >|t >]< >!; >}: 
Brand A coffee retails for $2. 30 per pound and 
Brand B coffee retails for $2. 90 per pound. In 
a mixture of just these two brands, what percentage 
of the mixture should be Brand A if  the retail  price 
of the mixture is to be $2. 7 5 per pound. Assume that 
the retail  price of the mixture is entirely dependent 
upon the retail  prices of the two brands. 
130 
Problem 6--Page 2 
Instructions: The four i tems shown below (A, B, C, D) are related 
to the problem you have just tried to solve. One or more of these items 
may remind you of your understanding of the problem. Put a 1 ,1" beside 
the letter for the item which you think best fi ts the way you thought about 
the problem in order to solve it .  Put "2" beside the i tem which would 
be NEXT BEST. Put "3" and "4" beside the i tems of your next two 
choices. Put "0" beside any which does not fit  at  all .  
Coffee Amount (lb) Price/lb 
A X 2. 30 
B ? 2. 90 
Mix 1 2. 75 
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Problem 6--Page 3 
The fractional  portion of Brand A in one pound of the 
required mixture is a certain ratio. That ratio is the 
difference between the price of one pound of Brand B 
and one pound of the mixture compared to the difference 
between the price of one pound of Brand B and one pound 
o f  B r a n d  A .  
2. 30 (X) + (1-X) 2. 90 = 2.  75 
or X = 2. 90 -  2. 75 
2. 90 -  2. 30 
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APPENDIX G 
RAW SAMPLE DATA: AGE, SEX, RANDOM ORDER OF 
COGNITIVE TASK PRESENTATION 
Random Order of 
Subject Age Sex 2 Cognitive Tasks 
Concrete Operational 
04 21 F 1, 2 
06 19 F 1, 2 
12, 19 F 2, 1 
13 21 F 1. 2 
15 25 F 1, 2 
17 20 F 2, 1 
19 21 F 1, 2 
23 23 F 1, 2 
24 20 F 1, 2 
25 35 F 2, 1 
29 42 F 2, 1 
31 23 F 2, 1 
38 23 F 1, 2 
n=l 3 mean= 24. 0 
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Random Order of 
Subject Age Sex 2 Cognitive Tasks 
Transitional Operational 
02 30 F 1, 2 
03 45 F 1, 2 
08 40 F 1, 2 
09 21 F 2, 1 
20 20 F 1, 2 
21 22 F 2, 1 
22 19 F 1, 2 
27 36 F 1, 2 
28 19 F 1, 2 
30 22 F 1, 2 
32 26 F 1, 2 
34 20 F 1, 2 
35 36 M 1, 2 
36 21 F 1, 2 
37 19 F 1, 2 
40 35 M 2, 1 
n=l6 mean= 26. 9 
Formal Operational 
01 25 F 2, 1 
05 19 F 2, 1 
07 32 F 2, 1 
10 21 F 1, 2 
11 28 F 1, 2 
14 34 F 1, 2 
16 28 M 2, 1 
18 20 F 2, 1 
26 32 M 1, 2 
33 20 F 2, 1 
39 20 F 2, 1 
n=tll  mean- 25.7 
134 
APPENDIX H 
RAW SCORES* ON COGNITIVE INTERVIEW TASK ONE: 
MARBLE TASK ON NOTIONS OF CHANCE 
Subjects Concrete Operational Items Formal Operational Items 
CI C2 C 3 F1 F2 
Concrete Operational 
04 X I 0 0 
06 1 0 0 0 
12 1 0 0 0 
13 1 1 0 0 
15 1 0 0 0 
17 X 0 0 0 
19 X 0 0 0 
23 1 0 0 0 
24 X 0 0 0 
25 1 1 0 0 
29 1 0 1 0 
31 1 0 0 0 
38 1 1 1 0 
n = 13 mean .= 1.0 1.0 .3 .2 .0 
* 1 = Pass 
0 = Fail  
X = Indeterminable 
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Subjects Concrete Operational Items 
CI C2 C 3 
Formal Operational Items 
F1 F2 
Transitional Operational 
02 X 1 1 0 1 
03 1 1 0 0 0 
08 0 1 1 0 1 
09 X 1 1 0 1 
20 1 1 0 
21 1 1 1 1 0 
22 1 0 1 1 0 
27 1 1 0 
28 1 1 0 
30 1 1 1 1 1 
32 1 1 1 1 1 
34 1 1 1 
35 1 1 1 1 0 
36 1 1 X 1 X 
37 1 1 1 1 1 
40 X 1 1 0 1 
n = 16 mean= .  7 
Formal Operational 
01 
05 
07 
10 X 
1 1  
14 
1 6  
18 X 
26 
33 
39 
.  9 . 6 
0 
1 
n  =  1 1  m e a n  = 1 . 0  1. 0 .  9 
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APPENDIX I 
RAW SCORES* ON COGNITIVE INTERVIEW TASK TWO: 
POKER CHIP TASK ON NOTIONS OF PROBABILITY 
Subjects Concrete Operational Items Formal Operational Items 
C4 C 5 C6 F3 F4 F5 
Concrete Operational 
04 1 1 0 0 0 
06 1 0 0 0 0 
12 1 1 0 1 0 
13 1 1 0 0 1 
15 1 0 0 0 0 
17 0 0 0 0 0 
19 0 1 0 0 1 
23 0 1 0 0 0 
24 0 1 0 0 0 
25 1 1 0 0 1 
29 1 1 0 0 0 
31 1 0 1 0 0 
38 1 1 0 0 0 
n = 13 1 . 0  .  1 . 2 
*1 = Pass 
0 = Fail  
X = Indeterminable 
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Subjects Concrete Operational Items Formal Operational Items 
C4 C 5 C6 F3 F4 F5 
Transitional Operational 
02 0 1 1 0 1 0 
0 3  1 1 1  1 1 1 
0 8  1 1 1  0 0 1 
0 9  1 1 1  1 0 0 
2 0  1 1 1  0 1 0 
2 1  1 1 1  1 1 0 
2 2  1 1 0  0 1 0 
2 7  1 1 1  0 1 1 
2 8  1 1 1  1 1 0 
3 0  1 1 1  0 0 0 
3 2  1 1 1  0 0 0 
3 4  1 1 1  1 1 0 
3 5  1 1 1  1 1 0 
3 6  1 1 1  1 1 0 
3 7  1 1 1  1 0 0 
4 0  1 1 1  0 1 1 
n = l 6  . 9  1 . 0  . 9  . 5  . 7  . 3  
Formal Operational 
0 1  
05 
07 
1 0  
11 
14 
16 
1 8  
26 
33 
39 
0 
0 
0 
1 
1 
0 
1 
0 
1 
1 
1 
n  =  1 1  1 . 0  1 . 0  1 . 0  1 . 0  1 . 0  . 5  
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APPENDIX J 
RAW SCORES FOR COGNITIVE STAGE LEVELS 
AND PROBLEM-SOLVING SUCCESS 
Scoring 
Degree of problem solving success is measured on the six problems 
below and is served according to the following code: 
0 = no success in mathematical problem solving 
1 = partial  success in mathematical problem solving 
2 = total success in mathematical problem solving 
Subject Algebraic Problems Geometric Problems 
Prob. 3 5 
Concrete Operational 
6_ Prob. 1 _2_ 4 
Mean 
Score 
04 1 1 1 2 0 1 1 . 0  
06 1 0 1 0 0 0 .  3 
12 2 0 1 0 0 1 .  7 
13 0 0 0 1 0 1 .  3 
15 2 0 1 1 0 1 .  8 
17 0 0 0 0 0 1 .  2 
19 1 0 1 1 1 1 .  8 
23 2 0 1 1 0 1 .  8 
24 0 0 0 1 0 1 .  3 
25 1 0 0 1 0 1 .  5 
29 0 0 0 2 1 1 .  7 
31 0 0 0 0 0 0 .  0 
38 2 1 1 1 1 2 1 . 3  
13 mean=. 9 .  2 .  5 .  8 .  2 .  9 0. 6 
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Subject Algebraic Problems 
Prob.3 5 6^ 
Transitional Operational 
Prob.l 
Geometric Problems 
Mean 
Score 
02 2 1 2 1 1 2 1 . 5  
03 0 0 0 1 0 1 .  3 
08 0 0 1 0 1 0 .  3 
09 1 0 1 1 0 1 .  7 
20 0 0 0 0 1 1 .  3 
21 2 1 1 1 0 1 1 . 0  
22 1 0 1 2 1 1 1. 0 
27 1 0 1 1 0 1 .  7 
28 2 2 1 1 0 1 1 . 2  
30 2 0 0 0 0 1 .  5 
32 0 0 0 0 0 1 .2 
34 1 1 1 2 1 1 1 . 2  
35 2 0 0 0 1 1 .  7 
36 0 0 1 0 0 1 .  3 
37 0 0 0 0 0 1 .  2 
40 2 1 1 0 1 1 1. 0 
n= 16 mean=l.  0 .4 .  7 .6 .4 1 . 0  0. 7 
Formal Operational 
01 2 0 0 1 1 1 .  8 
05 2 0 0 1 0 1 .  7 
07 1 1 0 2 1 1 1. 0 
10 0 0 0 2 1 1 .  7 
11 2 0 0 1 0 1 .  7 
14 2 2 1 2 1 2 1 . 7  
16 2 1 2 1 1 2 1. 5 
18 0 0 0 1 1 1 .  5 
26 2 0 0 1 0 1 .7 
33 2 0 0 1 0 1 .  7 
39 2 1 1 1 1 2 1. 3 
n= 11 mean=l.  5 .  5 .  4 1 . 3  .6 1. 3 0 . 9  
Cognitive Level 
Combined Stage Level Totals 
Raw Scores Percentages Totals 
Q_ 1 2 Q 1 2 Raw Score % 
i 
Concrete 38 33 7 48.7 42. 3 9.0 78 32.5 
Transitional 41 44 11 42.7 45.8 11.5 96 40.0 
Formal 21 29 16 31.8 43.9 24.3 66 27.5 
Totals 100 106 34 * 240 
Percentage 41.7 44.2 14.1 100% 
© 
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APPENDIX K 
RAW SCORES FOR COGNITIVE STAGE LEVELS 
AND LABELED FIGURES 
Scoring 
Labeled figure is measured on the six problems below and is scored 
according to the following code: 
0 = Subject did not label figure 
1 = Subject labeled figure spontaneously as part of the problem 
solving process 
Geometric Problems 
Prob. 3 5 6 Prob. 1 2 4 
Total Labels 
Concrete Operational (1)/SS 
04 0 0 1 0 0 0 1 
06 0 0 0 0 1 0 1 
12 0 0 0 0 1 1 2 
13 1 0 0 1 1 1 4 
15 0 0 0 0 1 1 2 
17 0 1 0 0 1 1 3 
19 0 0 0 1 1 1 3 
23 0 0 0 1 1 0 2 
24 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
25 0 0 1 1 1 1 4 
29 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
31 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
38 0 0 0 1 1 1 3 
m e a n  = 1 . 9  
choice 0= 12 12 11 8 4 6 
choice 1 = 1 1 2 5 9 7 
n=l3 total 
choices= 13 13 13 13 13 13 
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Subject Algebraic Problems Geometric Problems 
total 
n=l1 choices=ll 
Prob. 3 5 6 Prob. 1 _2_ 4 
Total Labels 
Transitional Operational (1)/SS 
02 0 0 1 0 0 0 1 
03 0 0 1 1 1 0 3 
08 1 0 1 1 0 3 
09 0 0 1 1 0 2 
20 0 1 1 1 1 1 5 
21 1 0 0 1 0 2 
22 0 0 1 1 1 0 3 
27 0 0 1 0 1 2 
28 0 0 1 1 1 1 4 
30 0 0 0 0 1 0 1 
32 0 0 0 0 1 0 1 
34 1 0 0 1 1 0 3 
35 1 0 0 0 1 1 3 
36 0 0 1 0 1 2 
37 0 0 0 0 1 1 2 
40 0 0 0 1 1 1 1 3 
mean=2. 5 
choice 0 
<M i—
l 
II 15 8 8 4 9 
choice 1 = 4 1 8 8 12 7 
. total 
n=l6 choices: = 16 16 16 .  16 16 16 
Formal Operational 
01 0 0 1 1 1 1 4 
05 0 0 0 1 1 0 2 
07 0 0 0 1 1 0 2 
10 0 0 0 1 0 1 2 
11 0 0 0 0 1 1 
14 0 0 0 1 0 0 1 
16 0 0 0 1 1 1 3 
18 0 0 1 0 0 1 
26 0 0 0 1 - 0 1 2 
33 0 0 0 1 1 1 3 
39 0 0 0 0 1 0 1 
mean=2. 0 
choice 0: =11 11 9 3 5 5 
choice 1 = = 0 0 2 8 6 6 
11 11 11 1 1  11 
APPENDIX L 
RAW SCORES FOR COGNITIVE STAGE LEVELS 
AND CHOSEN PROBLEM-SOLVING STRATEGY 
Scoring 
Preference of mathematical conceptual representation of one's 
problem solving strategy is measured on the six problems below and 
scored according to the following code: 
0 = No choice of a problem solving strategy was selected 
as representing how the subject solved the problem 
1 = Concrete,  pictorial figure 
2 = Abstract,  geometric figure 
3 = Algebraic,  numerical representation 
4 = Verbal,  logical description 
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Subject Algebraic Problems Geometric Problems 
Prob. 3 5 6 Prob. 1 2 4 
Concrete Operational 
04 2 4 3 1 4 1 
06 1 3 1 3 2 4 
12 1 1 1 1  2 2 
13 3 1 1 1 2 1 
15 4 3 3 2 4 2 
17 1 3 1 1 2 4 
19 3 1 3 2 2 1 
23 4 4 1 2 1 2 
24 1 4 2 3 4 1 
25 2 1 1 2 2 1 
29 4 4 3 1 4 3 
31 3 1 1 4 4 1 
38 4 1 1 1 2 2 
Choice 0= 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Choice 1 = 4 6 8 6 1 6 
Choice 2 = 2 0 1 4 7 4 
Choice 3 = 3 3 4 2 0 1 
Choice 4= 4 4 0 1 5 2 
n=13 Totals 13 13 13 13 13 13 
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Subject Algebraic Problems 
Prob. 3 _5_ _6_ 
Transitional Operational 
02 3 4 4 
03 0 1 1 
08 3 1 1 
09 1 1 1 
20 0. 1 1 
21 1 1 4 
22 1 1 1 
27 2 1 
28 2 1 1 
30 1 1 1 
32 1 0 4 
34 2 4 3 
35 2 3 1 
36 2 2 4 
37 3 3 1 
40 2 1 1 
Choice 0 = 2 1 0 
Choice 1 = 5 9 11 
Choice 2 = 6 1 0 
Choice 3 = 3 2 1 
Choice 4 = 0 3 4 
n= 16 Total 16 16 16 
Geometric Problems 
1 _2_ _£ 
4 0 1 
2 2 2 
1 4 1 
1 2 1 
1 2 1 
1 3 1 
2 2 2 
4 2 4 
1 2 2 
4 2 1 
1 1 1 
1 2 2 
2 2 2 
1 3 2 
2 2 2 
3 4 2 
0 1 0 
8 1 7 
4 10 8 
1 2 0 
3 2 1 
16 16 16 
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Subject Algebraic Problems Geometric Problems 
Prob. 3 _5_ _6_ Prob. 1 _2_ 4 
Formal Operational 
01 4 . 1  3 2 2 2 
05 3 4 1 3 2 3 
07 2 1 3 1 4 2 
10 0 0 4 0 4 1 
11 2 4 1 3 3 1 
14 1 4 3 0 4 2 
16 4 4 4 3 2 2 
18 3 4 1 1 2 2 
26 2 4 3 0 4 2 
33 1 1 2 1 2 2 
39 3 4 3 0 2 1 
Choice 0 = 1 1 0 4 0 0 
Choice 1 = 2 3 3 3 0 3 
Choice 2 = 3 0 1 1 6 7 
Choice 3 = 3 0 5 3 1 1 
Choice 4 = 2 7 2 0 4 0 
n = l l  X o t a l s  11 11 11 11 11 11 
Combined Stage Level Totals 
Cognitive 
Level Raw Score: Choice Percentage of Choice Totalfl  
0 1 2 3 4 0 1 2 3 4 
Raw 
Score % 
Concrete 0 31 18 13 16 0. 0 39. 7 23. 1 16.7 20. 5 78 32. 5 
Transitional 4 41 29 9 13 4. 2 42. 7 30. 2 9 . 4  13. 5 96 o
 
©
 
F  o rmal 6 14 18 13 15 9. 1 21. 2 27. 3 19. 7 22. 7 66 27. 5 
Totals 10 86 65 35 44 240 
Percentages 4.2 35. 8 27. 1 14. 6 18. 3 100% 
-j  
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APPENDIX M 
RAW SCORES FOR COGNITIVE STAGE LEVELS AND MATCfflNG 
CHOSEN AND USED PROBLEM-SOLVING STRATEGIES 
Scoring 
Matching (a) problem solving strategies actually employed and 
(b) one's stated preference of a mathematical strategy that best describes 
one's reasoning in understanding and solving the problem is measured 
on the six problems below and is scored according to the following code: 
0 = (a) and (b) do not match 
1 = (a) and (b) match: the subject 's preferred the same 
problem solving strategy that he/she actually used 
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Geometric Problems Total 
Prob. 3 5_ _6_ Prob.l  2_ 4_ Matches 
Concrete Operational 
(1)/SS 
04 1 0 1 1 0 0 3 
06 1 0 1 0 1 0 3 
12 1 0 1 1 1 1 5 
13 1 0 1 1 1 1 5 
15 0 0 1 1 0 1 3 
17 0 0 1 1 1 0 3 
19 0 0 1 0 1 0 2 
23 1 0 1 1 ± 1 5 
24 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 
15 1 0 1 0 1 1 4 
29 1 1 0 1 1 0 4 
31 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
38 0 0 1 1 1 1 4 
mean=3. 2 
Totals:  
No match (0): =6 12 3 5 4 6 
Matched (1) = = 7  1 10 8 9 7 
n = 13 13 13 13 13 13 13 
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Subject Algeb raic Problems Geometric Problems Total 
Prob. 3 _5_ _6_ Prob. 1 Z_ _4_ Matche 
0")/ss 
Transitional Operational 
02 1 1 1 0 0 1 4 
03 0 0 0 0 1 1 2 
08 0 0 1 1 0 0 2 
09 1 0 1 1 1 1 5 
20 0 1 1 1 1 0 4 
21 1 0 1 0 1 0 3 
22 0 0 1 0 1 1 3 
27 1 1 1 1 1 5 
28 1 0 1 1 1 1 5 
30 0 0 1 1 1 0 3 
32 0 0 0 1 1 2 
34 1 0 1 1 1 1 5 
35 0 0 1 0 1 1 3 
36 1 1 1 1 1 1 6 
37 0 0 1 0 1 3 
40 1 0 1 1 1 1 5 
mean=3. 8 
Totals:  
No Match (0) = 8 12 2 7 3 4 
Matched (1) = = 8  4 14 9 13 12 
n=l6  16  16  16  16 16 16 
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Subject Algebraic Problems Geometric Problems Total 
Prob. 3^ _5_ _6_ Prob. 1 2_ 4 Matches 
(1)/SS 
Formal Operational 
01 0 0 0 1 1 1 3 
05 1 0 0 1 1 0 3 
07 1 0 0 1 0 1 3 
10 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 
11 1 0 1 1 1 4 
14 1 1 1 0 0 1 4 
16 0 0 0 1 1 1 3 
18 0 0 1 0 0 1 2 
26 1 0 1 0 1 1 4 
33 0 0 0 1 1 1 3 
39 1 0 1 1 1 0 4 
mean = 3.1 
T otals 
No Match (0)=5 10 6 4 4 3 
Matched (1) = 6 1 5 7 7 8 
n = l 1  1 1  11 11 11 11 11 
